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A Neutral Conception of Reasonableness?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Daniel M. Weinstock
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Abstract

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Much liberal theorizing of the past twenty years has been built around a conception of neutrality and an accompanying virtue of reasonableness according to which citizens ought to be able to view public policy debates from a perspective detached from their comprehensive conceptions of the good. The view of “justificatory neutrality” that emerges from this view is discussed and rejected as embodying controversial views about the relationship of individuals to their conceptions of the good. It is shown to be based upon a “protestant” assumption according to which conceptions of the good can be cashed out in terms of propositional beliefs. An alternative conception of reasonableness, grounded in the stable disposition of individuals to prefer social peace over conflict is described. It is argued that it better satisfies the neutralist requirement than do theories of justificatory neutrality.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 3 , Issue 3 , October 2006, pp. 234 - 247
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2006

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