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Why Should We Care About the Concept of Knowledge?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Hilary Kornblith
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Abstract

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Can we learn something interesting about knowledge by examining our concept of knowledge? Quite a bit, many argue. My own view, however, is that the concept of knowledge is of little epistemological interest. In this paper, I critically examine one particularly interesting defense of the view that the concept of knowledge is of great epistemological interest: Edward Craig's Knowledge and the State of Nature. A minimalist view about the value of examining our concept of knowledge is defended.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 8 , Issue 1 , February 2011, pp. 38 - 52
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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