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Why the Empty Shells Were Not Fired: A Semi-Bibliographical Note*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Itzhak Gilboa
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Abstract

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This note documents Aumann's reason for omitting the “empty shells” argument for the common prior assumption from the final version of “Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality.” It then continues to discuss the argument and concludes that rational entities cannot learn their own identity; if they do not know it a priori, they never will.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 8 , Issue 3 , October 2011 , pp. 301 - 308
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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