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Nash equilibria for a model of traffic flow with several groupsof drivers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2012

Alberto Bressan
Affiliation:
Department of Mathematics, Penn State University University Park, 16802 Pa, USA. bressan@math.psu.edu; kxh323@psu.edu
Ke Han
Affiliation:
Department of Mathematics, Penn State University University Park, 16802 Pa, USA. bressan@math.psu.edu; kxh323@psu.edu

Abstract

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Traffic flow is modeled by a conservation law describing the density of cars. It isassumed that each driver chooses his own departure time in order to minimize the sum of adeparture and an arrival cost. There are N groups of drivers, Thei-th group consists of κidrivers, sharing the same departure and arrival costsϕi(t),ψi(t).For any given population sizesκ1,...,κn,we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium solution, where no driver can lower his owntotal cost by choosing a different departure time. The possible non-uniqueness, and acharacterization of this Nash equilibrium solution, are also discussed.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© EDP Sciences, SMAI, 2012