Hostname: page-component-74656f9884-g96k6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-10T06:31:14.811Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Pricing rules under asymmetric information

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 2007

Shigeyoshi Ogawa
Affiliation:
Department of Mathematical Sciences Ritsumeikan University, Kusatsu, Shiga, 525-8577 Japan; ogawa-s@se.ritsumei.ac.jp
Monique Pontier
Affiliation:
U.M.R. CNRS C 5583, Laboratoire de statistique et probabilités, Université Paul Sabatier, 118 route de Narbonne, 31062 Toulouse Cedex 04, France; pontier@lsp.ups-tlse.fr
Get access

Abstract

We consider an extension of the Kyle and Back's model [Back, Rev. Finance Stud.5 (1992) 387–409; Kyle, Econometrica35 (1985) 1315–1335],meaning a model for the market with a continuous time risky assetand asymmetrical information. There are threefinancial agents: the market maker, an insider trader (who knows a randomvariable V which will be revealed at final time) and a non informed agent. Here we assume thatthe non informed agent is strategic, namely he/she uses a utility function to optimize his/her strategy.Optimal control theory is applied to obtain a pricing ruleand to prove the existenceof an equilibrium price when the insider trader and the non informedagent are risk-neutral. We will show that if such an equilibrium exists, then the non informed agent's optimal strategy is to do nothing, in other words to be non strategic.

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable