Analysis of proportionality in the context of Article 5 TEU after the PSPP judgment – Bundesverfassungsgericht challenging Court of Justice to control European Central Bank’s motives – Doctrinal tradition of ‘smoking out’ illicit motives through proportionality – Article 5(4) TEU: proportionality of exercise of competences, primarily safeguarding member states’ autonomy – Court of Justice case law on proportionality: deferential standard of review towards measures of EU institutions – Bundesverfassungsgericht case law on federal competences and municipal autonomy: less deferential but still respectful standard of review – PSPP inconsistent with case law and with Article 5 TEU – Balancing-stage of proportionality unsuitable for motive control

Authority of the European Central Bank (the Bank) over its operational norms in the eyes of market actors – Exogenous and endogenous authority and legitimacy – The reconciliation by the Bank and the Court of Justice of the EU (the Court) of the pre-existing norm and political-economic reality with Article 123 TFEU – Sovereign lender of last resort – Eurozone Crisis – Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) – Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) – Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP)

First preliminary reference of the German Federal Constitutional Court – ECB Outright Monetary Transaction Programme (OMT) – Financial crisis – Ultra vires review – Principle of democracy – Judicial dialogue – Separation of powers – National constitutional identity – Mandate of the ECB – Article 123 TFEU – Article 18.1 ESCB-Statute – Economic and monetary policy – Honeywell test partially abandoned – Pringle judgment inverted – No margin of discretion for the ECB – Necessity, and prohibition of functional misuse, under Article 267 TFEU – Comparative reasoning

Lisbon decisions of the constitutional courts in Austria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia and Poland from a comparative perspective – Democracy, sovereignty and identity – Permeability of national and supranational law – Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and its constitutional foundations – Procedural background and legal outcome of the Lisbon decisions – Differences of institutional self-conception – Parliamentary responsibility for integration – Prior parliamentary assent to the future application of ‘dynamic treaty provisions’ – Different conceptions of national and multi-levelled democracy – Popular vote – Constitutional limits to European integration – Limits indicating the necessity of an amendment and limits protecting the inalienable substantial core of a constitutional order – German Bundesverfassungsgericht only court in Europe spelling out an eternity clause in a detailed, catalogue style manner – Judicial restraint – Ultra vires and identity review – Article 4.2 TEU as an integration clause of EU law and not a derogation clause – Comparative dialectics

Broad concept of constitutional jurisdiction – Triangle between Karlsruhe, Strasbourg and Luxembourg – European vocation of the German Constitutional Court and Basic Law – European Convention on Human Rights – Karlsruhe decisions can be reviewed in Strasbourg – Human rights-related constitutional court – European Court of Justice developed into constitutional court of the Union – Verbund between three courts – No simplistic hierarchy – Verbund techniques – Dialogue in Human Rights; Interplay in Integration – Federal Constitutional Court and European Court of Human Rights functionally comparable – Both Courts seek substantive coherence as Verbund technique – Federal Constitutional Court commits all German authorities to the Convention – Federal Constitutional Court and ECJ – Principle of openness to European Law – Sharing and assigning responsibilities in complex system – Solange, ultra vires and identity review – Responsibility for integration, due by Court and other German bodies – Federal Court contributes to common European Constitutional order – Europe-wide discursive struggle and ‘Lernverbund’