Introduction
How do populists manage international security policies? This question has gained increasing prominence in scholarly debates in international relations (IR). Contrary to the widespread assumption that populist leaderships are more inherently aggressive, radical, and unpredictable, and therefore more prone to conflict escalation, a growing body of literature challenges this view.Footnote 1 Recent studies suggest that some populists in power, including those on the right, often exhibit pragmatic, inward-looking, or risk-averse behaviour in the security domain.Footnote 2 As several scholars have noted, populists may at times resemble ‘dogs that bark but do not bite’.Footnote 3 This debate raises important questions about the mechanisms underlying such apparent restraint, as well as the contextual and ideological conditions under which it is more likely to emerge or break down. These unresolved issues point to the need for more systematic examination of the factors shaping populist engagement with international security.
This article seeks to contribute to this effort by developing a clearer understanding of when and how populist leaderships translate their confrontational rhetoric into concrete security actions. While the rhetorical side of populist security-making – marked by polarising people-versus-elites discourse, dramatic posturing, and warlike language – is well documented, considerably less attention has been paid to the implementation of actual security measures.Footnote 4 To address this gap, we introduce an analytical framework that distinguishes five categories of security policy action – geopolitical, material, institutional, operational, and ideational. This framework enables a nuanced assessment of the ways populist narratives are translated (or not) into policy practice.Footnote 5
We apply this framework to an in-depth single-case study of Poland under the rule of the populist right-wing Law and Justice party (PiS) between 2015 and 2023.Footnote 6 We find the case particularly suitable given the centrality of international security in both Polish politics and PiS’s platform, as well as the availability of a longitudinal perspective that allows for tracing policy changes across successive governments.Footnote 7 While in opposition, PiS called for a tougher stance towards Russia, emphasising the potential military threat to Poland and NATO’s eastern flank, while accusing the centre-liberal coalition of Civic Platform (PO) and the Polish People’s Party (PSL) (2007–15) of subordinating national interests to Germany and France. PiS thus advocated for a more independent and assertive security policy, higher defence spending, and the removal of military officials with alleged post-communist affiliations. Given these background conditions, Poland under PiS was expected to be an ‘easy case’ for demonstrating populist assertiveness in security policy-making – what George and Bennett describe as a ‘most-likely’ case, especially useful in the early stages of theory-building and for refining scope conditions.Footnote 8
However, as this study shows, once in power, PiS initially reduced defence spending, with major increases occurring only after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This apparent inconsistency between PiS’s confrontational rhetoric and its reluctant policy execution makes Poland an illustrative case for understanding why verbal hostility did not translate into substantive policy action. We argue that PiS’s behaviour was shaped by a two-level game in which the party had to reconcile its strongly anti-Russian domestic rhetoric with the more restrained perceptions of Russia held by its key allies in NATO and, in particular, the United States (US). These constraints were further compounded by domestic factors, including resistance from military officers, expert criticism, and heightened tensions with the European Union (EU) over rule-of-law violations.
Our findings suggest that PiS sought to fundamentally revise Poland’s security policy-making only after 2022. The strategic landscape changed dramatically following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as Poland deepened its reliance on NATO and the United States, while its allies simultaneously adopted views of Russia that came much closer to those long held in Warsaw.Footnote 9 This moment also constituted a favourable status-seeking opportunity for the PiS government, as Poland’s earlier threat assessments were vindicated, allowing it to position itself as a key US ally in the region and to claim moral and strategic superiority over France and Germany.Footnote 10 The war also turned Poland into a vital hub for aid to Ukraine and a more critical NATO ally in efforts to contain Russia. Heavily securitised, Poland spent 4.7 per cent of its GDP on defence in 2025 (43.6 billion Euro in absolute terms), positioning it as a leading military power within the EU and the fifth largest contributor to NATO after the United States, Germany, the UK, and France.Footnote 11 This case illustrates the importance of not analysing populist security policy solely through declarative rhetoric or essentialist understandings of populism’s mechanisms. Instead, we advocate a contextualised approach that examines the conditions enabling populist governments to be more or less capable of enacting significant policy change. Time, space, and the structural constraints of governance matter for populism as well.
The article proceeds as follows. First, we review the existing literature on the theoretical nexus between populism and international (in)security, with particular attention to defence strategies adopted by populist governments globally. Second, we present our conceptual framework, outlining the geopolitical, material, institutional, operational, and ideational dimensions of security policy. Third, we apply this framework to the case of Poland under PiS (2015–23), using a combination of official documents, secondary sources, and twenty-eight anonymised in-depth interviews with senior policymakers, diplomats, military officials, and policy experts conducted from July 2023 to March 2024.Footnote 12 Finally, we reflect on the broader implications of our findings and propose directions for future research on populism and security.
Global populism and international (in)security
The academic community has shown increasing concern with the international aspects of populism.Footnote 13 A expanding body of IR scholarship has emerged to explore this phenomenon, seeking to answer questions about the sources and patterns of the contemporary populist global wave.Footnote 14 As this wave evolved into a tsunami, IR scholars increasingly focused on populism’s rise to power and its global effects. While notable progress has been made in analysing its impact on policies, politics, and polities,Footnote 15 there remains broad agreement that further theory-driven and policy-oriented research is needed to understand populism’s consequences on specific, underexamined issue areas.
Until relatively recently, international security constituted one of the least explored domains in the last wave of populism research, certainly in comparison to policy areas such as international cooperationFootnote 16 or trade.Footnote 17 Although populist leaderships were frequently portrayed as threats to global peace and stability, systematic analyses of how populist governments shape, resist, or transform inter-state security dynamics remained scarce. Several valuable studies have primarily focused on domestic-level processes through analyses of security narratives,Footnote 18 securitisation,Footnote 19 and ontological security.Footnote 20 Yet far fewer studies have addressed the implications of populist governance for inter-state conflict, alliance politics, and international stability.
More recently, a growing body of literature has begun to analyse populist leadership behaviour in relation to concrete practices of international security, including crisis escalation,Footnote 21 militarisation,Footnote 22 territorial revisionism,Footnote 23 security cooperation and alignments,Footnote 24 and military intervention.Footnote 25 Despite these advances, the field continues to offer two competing interpretations of this relationship between populist rhetoric and the implementation of security policies. One perspective holds that populists’ confrontational discourse, marked by provocative language, enemy construction, and assertions of national strength, translates into revisionist, escalatory, or militarised strategies. The alternative view suggests that while populists maintain a combative rhetorical style, they often act cautiously in practice, thereby limiting the translation of rhetoric into substantive security measures. Further theoretical and empirical work is required to adjudicate between, or bridge, these competing interpretations.
This article addresses this gap by systematically unpacking the relationship between rhetoric and action in populist security policy-making and by grounding this analytical framework in an in-depth study of a case of right-wing populist government in Europe. In doing so, it examines the conditions under which populist security rhetoric is more likely to translate into escalatory and militarised strategies – including military build-up, crisis escalation, alliance restructuring, collective uses of force, and territorial revisionism – with potentially destabilising consequences for international (in)security.
Talking tough, acting cautiously
One strand of research argues that populist leaders often pair confrontational rhetoric with cautious behaviour, strategically separating discourse from policy, especially in defence matters. Operating under comparable conditions, they are no more prone to military adventurism than other leaders, as their actions remain constrained by structural factors such as alliances, economic interdependence, and domestic veto players.Footnote 26 The absence of strong truth-claim expectations placed on populist actors further enables rhetorical de-escalation.Footnote 27 This dynamic reduces the political costs associated with abandoning threats or unfulfilled promises, thereby lowering the so-called audience costs typically associated with foreign policy reversals.
Moreover, the people-versus-elite polarising frame of populism functions primarily as a tool for domestic mobilisation rather than as a guide for security action. Translating confrontational rhetoric into actual security measures against adversaries can undermine the political dividends such rhetoric generates, since real-world engagement may entail economic hardship, casualties, or diplomatic backlash. Populist leaders also often avoid multilateral actions like interventions or peacekeeping, particularly when these clash with an isolationist, ‘Jacksonian’ orientation.Footnote 28 Even when considered justified, their military action is framed around direct national interest rather than collective security. The ‘Us First’ logic drives populists in hegemonic states – including right-wing ones – to reject burden sharing through troops, weapons, or funding.Footnote 29 This inward focus is reinforced by populist governments’ passive stance on human costs, especially when political gains are prioritised.Footnote 30
Finally, many populists use aggressive rhetoric as performative deterrence – threats and bravado aimed at gaining leverage without acting. Their ‘bark’ reinforces a self-image as strategic negotiators or ‘deal-makers’ who extract concessions without ‘biting’.Footnote 31 The ostensibly more assertive posture adopted by populist leaderships may also extend to relations with allies, in which resorting to blackmail serves dual purposes: reinforcing domestic mobilisation while maximising the material benefits of alignment. Thus, even when security practices are politicised, centralised, and personalised, this does not automatically translate into greater risk-taking, escalation, or militarisation.Footnote 32
Talking tough, striking hard
Contrastingly, other scholars argue that populists can and do engage in assertive or coercive action. They are often more willing to revise the content of security policy and to confront international rivals, and their ‘strongman’ leadership style frequently aligns with a muscular approach to security in which force is regarded as a legitimate and expedient instrument for resolving domestic and international disputes.Footnote 33
From this perspective, populist militarism shapes not just rhetoric but also policy implementation, responding to the radicalised, polarised environment they help create. Antagonism towards transnational elites and the stigmatisation of foreign ‘others’ can escalate beyond securitisation and security narratives, producing intra- and inter-state hostilities.Footnote 34 These dynamics are particularly evident when populism – the ‘thin ideology’ – is combined with ‘thicker’ ideologies, often rooted in ethno-national or ethno-religious frameworks, associated with right-wing variants of populism.Footnote 35 Yet propensity to escalation is reinforced by populists’ ‘angry’ temperaments and tactical use of diversionary domestic or sophisticated international manoeuvres, making confrontational rhetoric a likely precursor rather than a substitute for concrete action.Footnote 36
In institutional terms, the personalisation and centralisation of decision-making under populist rule can undermine expert-driven processes and diminish the check-and-balance role of professional diplomatic, military, and other security authorities – the so-called deep state. This can result in an incapacity to design consistent grand strategies and collective security frameworks, increasing the likelihood of impulsive, high-stakes decisions with limited oversight.Footnote 37 In more extreme cases, particularly with the juxtaposition of authoritarianism and ethno-nationalism, security ‘biting’ may include territorial revisionism, withdrawal from alliances, and the reopening of deals in international disputes.Footnote 38 In all these cases, populist leadership are more prone to revise the defence approach to threats to national and international security.
To advance the debate, this study shifts focus from whether populists act on their rhetoric to the conditions under which such action is more likely. We propose a theoretical framework that considers temporal and spatial context, identifying five categories of policy dimensions through which populists’ narratives translate into behaviour.
Unravelling populist security policy dimensions
We categorise security into five interrelated dimensions – geopolitical, material, institutional, operational, and ideational – to establish a theoretical foundation for hypothesising how populism may constrain or steer policy-making across different domains.
Geopolitical dimension
The first category examines whether populist governments actively seek to alter their external empowerment in geopolitical terms. IR theories generally identify two mechanisms for increasing hard power: military spending and new security alignments.Footnote 39 Changes in external and internal ‘balancing’ can have multiple (un)intended consequences for the structure of the international security system, especially when enacted by regionally or globally dominant powers.
We can expect populist governments to be more prone to recreate their geopolitical alignments against perceived threats, seeking to improve their relational power in the international system. This means populists establish new military alignments, building on their broader tendency to associate with like-minded regimes. This may redefine international ‘friends’ and ‘foes’, restructuring alliances and enmities in the medium term.Footnote 40 Some populists may also perceive these new partnerships as a ‘green light’ for previously avoided revisionist actions, potentially undermining balancing mechanisms and compliance with international norms.Footnote 41
Conversely, from a ‘pure realist’ perspective, populists should not differ from other national leaders.Footnote 42 Their actions are primarily public relations tactics that do not alter national security interests or decision-making regarding military alliances, and thus have limited impact on power structures or balancing in the international security system.
Material dimension
This category focuses on national force-building, particularly the development of military capabilities to enhance security, often linked to resource-based security strategies.Footnote 43 In this sense, we can expect populist governments to be more inclined to increase spending on international security tools, which are positioned as counter-measures against perceived threats. This aligns with their rhetoric, shaped by aggressive posturing and a Manichaean worldview. Relevant literature highlights their tendency to expand military personnel and militarisation practices.Footnote 44
Conversely, recent scholarship has shown that at least some populists do not significantly increase military spending or personnel, indicating that the link between populism and force-building is nuanced and warrants further study on its scope and context.Footnote 45
Institutional dimension
The third category explores whether populist governments implement institutional changes within key security organisations. Research shows that populists favour highly politicised and centralised foreign policy structures to advance domestic political interests.Footnote 46 This instrumental approach extends to security policy-making, where decisions are often delegated to a small circle of loyal allies – from the family, party, or intelligence bodies – bypassing traditional institutions accused of cosmopolitan bias. Marked by anti-pluralistic, anti-intellectual, and anti-expertise tendencies, populism thus erodes trust in non-majoritarian authorities and fragments governance structures.Footnote 47
From this perspective, we hypothesise that populist governments are more likely to weaken institutional frameworks that promote international cooperation, professionalisation, and governance in security affairs. During crises, populists often launch inflammatory attacks against ‘globalist’ technocracies to divert blame and reinforce their legitimacy.Footnote 48 This combination of rhetorical backlash and decision-making drift delegitimises institutional frameworks for collective security, weakening international cooperation and reducing the quality of security governance. However, some argue that while populists undermine supranational governance, this may simultaneously reinforce traditional state-centric security structures.
Operational dimension
The fourth category examines whether populist governments actively employ military capabilities to address security threats. In this sense, populist governments seem more inclined to use military tools in the event of conflict escalation with direct and indirect enemies. Indeed, populist rhetoric often promotes military solutions to geopolitical problems and foreign interference in response to security threats.Footnote 49 This belligerent stance, dramatising imminent ‘victory’ against enemies of the people’s will, can foster misperceptions that escalate crises.
This tendency intensifies when belligerence is paired with a leader’s cult of personality, emotion-driven and centralised decision-making, and the use of polarisation, restorative narratives, and ‘blaming and shaming’ tactics. In such contexts, populists may provoke rally-round-the-flag effects through diversionary conflicts, resorting to unpredictable uses of force rather than mere threats. This behaviour exacerbates security dilemmas, fuels arms races, and heightens both existing and emerging international tensions.
A counter-argument would suggest that, under normal conditions, populists concentrate their energies, resources, and tools on their domestic ‘threats’, and therefore are more averse to engaging in international conflicts abroad. Furthermore, they are more reluctant to intervene in new ‘inter-mestic’ crises to defend fundamental human rights previously upheld by liberals on both the left and the right.
Ideational dimension
The final category addresses the active promotion by populist governments of a revisionist zeitgeist, particularly in relation to territorial claims and material demands. In this sense, we can expect populist governments to be more likely to reshape national and international attitudes towards potential threats, thereby encouraging the revision and radicalisation of policies designed to deal with them. Indeed, a core feature of populist discourse is the stigmatisation of antagonistic ‘Others’, blamed for various crises, as a tool for political mobilisation. This strategy fosters a revisionist environment characterised by ontological (in)security, deepening polarisation, and radicalised ethno-national identities.Footnote 50
Populist governments channel domestic discontent towards vulnerable ‘Others’ and delegitimise national security establishments that uphold liberal values and norms, while also shaping popular attitudes towards ‘foreign’ enemies and transnational bureaucracies seen as complicit. This fosters a securitised, conspiratorial global narrative marked by drama, crisis, and antagonism, lowering thresholds for radicalisation and potential inter-state violence. Nevertheless, populists often distinguish between rhetoric and concrete policy and may refrain from direct international confrontation, even if their discourse gradually raises the risk of conflict.
Populist security policies under the Polish government of PiS, 2015–23
Case background
The period from 2015 to 2023 offers a valuable window for examining shifts in Polish security policy before, during, and after the populist ‘treatment’.Footnote 51 During these eight years, Poland was ruled by the right-wing populist PiS.Footnote 52 In 2023, a centre-left coalition led by former prime minister Donald Tusk – who also served as president of the European Council from 2014 to 2019 – won the national elections. Prior to PiS’s rise to power in 2015, Poland was governed by the liberal PO and the moderate-conservative PSL, with Bronisław Komorowski (PO-aligned) serving as president from 2010 to 2015. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014 triggered an early crisis response from liberal elites, notably Prime Minister Tusk and Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, both of whom reassumed prominent government roles in 2023.
Unlike many other European right-wing populist parties, PiS did not adopt anti-American rhetoric or express sympathy towards Russia or China.Footnote 53 Poland’s strategic culture and security reliance on the United States precluded the mainstreaming of such agendas.Footnote 54 During its 2005–7 term, PiS – under President Lech Kaczyński, the twin brother of Jarosław Kaczyński – positioned itself as the most uncompromisingly anti-Russian force in Polish politics. This orientation became central to the party’s identity, reinforced by Lech Kaczyński’s condemnation of Russia’s 2008 aggression against Georgia and further symbolically entrenched after his death in the 2010 Smolensk plane crash.
From the opposition, PiS called for a more assertive security posture. Its 2014 manifesto pledged to reverse the ‘steady decline in defense capacities’, emphasising NATO membership and the bilateral relationship with the United States as cornerstones of Polish security. To this end, the party advocated higher military spending, personnel expansion, command reform, and strengthening the domestic defence industry.Footnote 55 In the words of a top-level career diplomat who collaborated with both PO/PSL and PiS:
The PiS exploited the disillusionment of important social groups with the simplistic vision of Polish international success that undoubtedly accompanied the PO/PSL governments. (XI)Footnote 56
Indeed, PiS security experts frequently criticised the lack of realistic assessment and what they saw as a naïve foreign policy posture. For instance, Witold Waszczykowski – a prominent PiS figure and minister of foreign affairs from 2015 to 2018 – has long emphasised the growing insecurity in Poland’s neighbourhood due to Russia’s revisionist ambitions, criticising the PO/PSL coalition for adopting only a superficial toughness. Waszczykowski claimed that the PO/PSL’s pre-2014 efforts to improve relations with Russia were primarily aimed at gaining the sympathy of Western elites, especially Germany and France. He also asserted that a robust defence of Ukrainian sovereignty and punitive measures against Russian aggression should have been Poland’s raison d’état.Footnote 57 A central indictment of the PO/PSL government was that, despite Poland’s active role during the Maidan protests and the onset of Russia’s aggression in 2014, Warsaw was excluded from the Normandy format:Footnote 58
It was a good initiative by Sikorski to go to Kiev in 2014 and support Ukraine with ministers from France and Germany. But later the Normandy format was established without Poland … This showed that PO/PSL’s position was so weak that France and Germany could ignore us. (II)
Criticism of the PO/PSL’s security approach intensified by May 2015, when PiS-backed candidate Andrzej Duda won the presidential election, followed by PiS’s parliamentary majority in October of the same year. From then until October 2023, PiS ruled comfortably, without needing to form coalitions or negotiate with a president from the opposite camp. In 2022, Europe witnessed its largest war since 1945, as Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The PiS government responded with unequivocal political support and substantial material assistance to Kyiv. In the following sections, we analyse how Polish security policy evolved under PiS rule, according to the five thematic categories.
Geopolitical dimension
In this section, we examine the geopolitical realignments that took place under PiS leadership, evaluating whether the Polish government met our theoretical expectations. The case reveals a partial reconfiguration of alliances and a partial redefinition of ‘friends’ and ‘foes’, marked by a downgrading of allied relations with partners from continental Europe, and a clear effort to forge closer ties with other fellow right-wing populists, most notably Donald Trump and (pre-2022) Viktor Orbán. In key strategic areas PiS represented continuity with previous governments in maintaining a close alignment with the United States. However, it went further than its predecessors in relying almost exclusively on the United States and explicitly downplaying complementation with European security cooperation. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the backing and support provided to Kyiv by the PiS-led government ran counter to traditional right-wing mistrust towards Ukraine, yet aligned with a strategy deeply embedded in Polish elite thinking, which advocates supporting the sovereignty of states between Poland and Russia as a foundation of Polish security.Footnote 59
Polish–US relations evolved in that period across four distinct phases. During the final period of Obama’s presidency, PiS sought to preserve the security alliance while containing the impact of rule-of-law disputes, which the United States nonetheless raised. Under Trump, relations deepened markedly, characterised by strong personal ties between leaders and an intensified strategic embrace. With Biden’s inauguration until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, relations cooled: while alliance commitments remained intact, Poland’s practical standing declined amid renewed rule-of-law tensions. The fourth phase, beginning in 2022, brought a sharp strategic revaluation. Despite continued Democratic leadership in Washington, Poland rose significantly in importance as a frontline state, partially sidelining rule-of-law frictions – though these later resurfaced and again complicated the relationship.
Importantly, the first phase included attempts to reimagine Poland’s geopolitical positioning through alternative configurations, most notably the Intermarium concept – a regional alliance stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea – as well as broader outreach to China.Footnote 60 As one senior Polish diplomat with experience across successive governments observed, PiS initially sought ‘an alternative to a strong connection with the European West’, viewing Intermarium partly as an expression of aversion to Germany, France, and what it perceived as excessive EU proceduralism (XI). While these initiatives gained some domestic backing, they also met resistance from factions wary of establishing a regional alternative to the EU (XI). In practice, the tentative opening towards China was eventually abandoned under pressure from the Trump administration (VIII).
Phase two began with Trump’s election, which the PiS government used to intensify its strategic alignment with the United States. Bilateral relations acquired a pronounced personalist dimension, centred on the publicly emphasised bond between Trump and Duda. Trump’s visit to Warsaw – featuring a speech before a large, state-organised crowd – stood in marked contrast to the critical receptions he faced in several Western European capitals. PiS instrumentalised this contrast to portray Poland as a uniquely loyal and reliable US partner:
Many countries have sought good relations with Trump’s America. Few have succeeded… Poland is undoubtedly a beneficiary of the Trump era. First of all, Poles in the US did a good job connecting us with him. Second, we did not hesitate to congratulate him right from the start. We also managed to convince President Trump that he owed his election victory to the American Polish people in the swing states. President Trump has never made any pro-Russian statements in our presence, we have not been encouraged to take any pro-Russian actions. (XIX)
The personalist character of this phase was epitomised by the ‘Fort Trump’ initiative, which sought to secure a permanent US military presence in Poland, at times sidestepping broader NATO consultations. At the 2018 NATO summit, allied concerns about US security commitments became visible. In subsequent bilateral talks, Duda advanced the idea of a permanent US presence in Poland under the label ‘Fort Trump’. Although the label was ultimately dropped – partly due to congressional sensitivities – the episode illustrated Warsaw’s willingness to personalise alliance politics to reinforce bilateral ties.Footnote 61 During Duda’s 2019 visit to the White House, Trump agreed to deploy an additional 1,000 US troops to Poland, rotated from Germany – an arrangement that reinforced PiS’s narrative of Poland as a dependable ally contrasted with an allegedly unreliable and free-riding Germany. However, diplomats associated with the previous PO government offered a more sceptical assessment: ‘Fort Trump was pure PR, to flatter Trump, these are the same troops Obama committed to’ (XVI). ‘Although it looked impressive rhetorically, Poland gained nothing from Trump’ (V).
These dynamics shifted with Biden’s inauguration in 2021. Bilateral relations deteriorated as Duda was among the last leaders to acknowledge Biden’s electoral victory, and the new administration openly criticised democratic backsliding in Poland, further contributing to PiS’s international isolation:
In December 2021, as the Russian military presence near Ukraine began to build, Biden initially contacted only Western European leaders. By mid-December, a call was arranged with the entire B9, but in a way not to elevate Duda’s status. (IV)
The cooling of relations would likely have persisted but for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The war elevated Poland to the top tier of US security partners – ranked, according to Interviewee XX, among the eight to ten most important globally – and, in the initial months, allowed Warsaw to punch above its weight in regional security policy.Footnote 62 It also enabled the PiS-led government to re-establish itself as a key US partner in the region.
The most consequential realignment concerned relations with Germany and France. Under PiS, the EU was increasingly portrayed as an extension of German hegemonic ambitions, with Berlin depicted as competitor/adversary and the driving force behind rule-of-law proceedings against Poland.Footnote 63 ‘In essence, Germany drained the water, causing our diplomatic efforts to run aground. The scandal surrounding the rule of law within the EU had a paralysing effect on any diplomatic actions. PiS found itself isolated’ (XII). Berlin was thus treated with deep distrust: ‘There was a conviction that the Germans and the French would not die for Gdańsk. And the Americans, yes, because we cooperate well and bear the heaviest responsibility in Iraq, Afghanistan’ (XIV). Finally, German and French elites were portrayed as corrupt and profit-driven, prioritising national and personal gain over the security of East-Central Europe. Their political and business establishments were depicted as being ‘in Putin’s pocket’, notably through support for the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, seen as undermining NATO’s eastern flank (IX).
Within Europe, PiS viewed Hungary and the Conservative-led UK as its principal security partners. Russia’s 2022 invasion strengthened ties with London – previously weakened after Brexit curtailed joint Eurosceptic coordination in the European Parliament – while relations with Orbán deteriorated markedly.Footnote 64 In internal PiS discussions, Budapest’s accommodation of Moscow was at times rationalised as a function of German influence. Berlin was depicted as indirectly advancing its own Russia policy through Budapest: ‘We know that well: this is German policy. Germans do not want a complete break with Russia, and Hungarians can be used to voice it’ (IV).
In sum, the geopolitical dimension underscores the imprint of domestic politics on PiS’s foreign policy. In a context perceived as relatively secure, the party prioritised alignment with fellow right-wing populists, while portraying Germany, France, and the EU as normative and political adversaries. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine prompted a partial shift towards realpolitik. Confronted with war on its borders, the PiS leadership moved decisively to support Ukraine, articulating an unequivocal commitment that departed from traditional right-wing mistrust towards Kyiv. The shock of war also enabled closer cooperation with the Democratic-led United States and a more instrumental engagement with the EU as a platform for supporting Ukraine. Yet this recalibration remained bounded. It did not produce a broader normalisation of relations with Germany and France, even as 2022 marked a turning point in their own Russia policies. The case illustrates how ideological cleavages structured geopolitical alignments, while external shocks constrained – but did not fully displace – them.
Material dimension
The Polish case suggests a more differentiated trajectory than a straightforward populist expansion of material capabilities. Across PiS’s eight years in office, force-building unfolded in distinct phases. The initial period was marked not by expansion but rather by a temporary decline in defence spending, linked to the cancellation of procurement contracts with European partners as part of the broader geopolitical realignment discussed above (Figure 1). A second phase, coinciding with Trump’s presidency, saw renewed increases in military expenditure, with major US arms purchases embedded in the logic of deepening bilateral ties. These increases, however, largely compensated for earlier slowdowns rather than constituting a structural leap in capabilities. The decisive shift occurred only in 2022, when Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine triggered a sharp rise in defence spending and an unprecedented transfer of military equipment from Polish stockpiles to Ukraine. Taken together, the evidence indicates that the mere accession of a populist government did not automatically translate into sustained or immediate growth in material force-building; rather, expansion was contingent on both geopolitical alignment and acute external threat.
Military spending in Poland (1990–2023).
The dynamics of the first two phases were assessed by an experienced security expert as follows:
If we buy weapons from the US, he will like us. If he likes us, we don’t need Europe. We can be America’s pet, build Fort Trump, and live happily in our conservative world. This was PiS’s thinking at the time. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) had significant influence over purchases, with a clear ‘no’ to European equipment. It began with Macierewicz’s withdrawal from the Caracal deal [French helicopters] and continued thereafter. Apart from the UK, whose industries were part of larger consortiums, and limited cooperation with Italy, no European weapons were purchased. (VII)
As another interviewee emphasises, it was the transactional relationship with Trump – rather than fear of Russia – that drove the increase in military procurements in 2018.
Military purchases such as the F-35 and Abrams tanks served primarily a political function. Until December 2021, there was no official assessment suggesting that Russia might launch a war against Poland or NATO. Although PiS has claimed it always viewed Russia as a direct threat, little was done in terms of concrete military acquisitions prior to 2022. The first PiS strategic document in May 2017 mentioned Russia’s potential for war, but focused on the 2030s, implying that the threat was considered to be fifteen years away. (XVIII)
This reveals that the tough rhetoric about the Russian threat – aimed primarily at the domestic audience – was not reflected in official documents, and even less so in actual arms procurement. One of Poland’s most experienced military officials emphasises:
In 2014, Russians suddenly appeared in Crimea. In 2022, we were again caught off guard, suddenly realizing that we were now a frontline state. Everyone was looking at us, our position became crucial. (XV)
In the first months of the war, material capabilities became central to Poland’s security policy. As Sus argues, the combination of rapid rearmament and large-scale military assistance significantly elevated Poland’s standing in Europe and in its relations with the United States.Footnote 65 While many allies hesitated, Poland became the largest provider of military support to Ukraine after the United States in terms of value.Footnote 66 The governing elite embraced the narrative of Europe’s geopolitical centre of gravity shifting eastward, emphasising Poland’s leadership in shaping the Western response and using this posture of moral resolve to push rule-of-law disputes into the background.
Procurement policy became a key instrument for signalling Poland’s strategic partnerships and asserting superiority vis-à-vis European states. Initially, as Interviewee XVIII noted, the government was prepared to purchase ‘more equipment than was available on the market’, with the largest contracts awarded to the United States. South Korea emerged as the second major supplier, reflecting Warsaw’s preference for partners outside Europe perceived as more reliable. Experts argued that even if Poland had sought to procure more within Europe, limited industrial capacity – after years of underinvestment – restricted viable options. At the same time, this argument reinforced a broader narrative portraying European states as unreliable and as having pursued misguided Russia policies whose consequences could not easily be reversed (XVIII). Procurement also provided fertile ground for politicisation. Arms deals were accompanied by inflated rhetoric and carefully staged displays of military strength, marking a departure from the post-1989 transition norm of maintaining a clear separation between military affairs and partisan politics.
While there was broad bipartisan consensus on increasing defence spending after 2022, some senior experts warned that the government’s approach risked overreach. In their view, ambitious rhetoric and headline troop targets could come at the expense of strategic coherence, training quality, and the development of a sustainable defence–industrial base:
PiS talks populistically about spending 4 percent on defence, but I’m less enthusiastic about these figures. The key issue is not just how much we spend, but how we spend it. Similarly, I’m not keen on the debate about having an army of 200,000 or 300,000. A 400,000-strong army in peacetime is costly and disproportionate to benefits. The army should align with strategy, tasks, threats, and the equipment we have, as well as being properly trained. (V)
Indeed, after 2022, politicisation of the armed forces and their deployment for propaganda purposes reached an unprecedented scale. To quote a top military who served under PiS: ‘The question wasn’t just whether we need a 300,000-strong army, but whether it should be used solely to win elections’ (XV). The narrative about a 300,000-strong army was primarily propagandistic, as experts pointed out that this figure included bizarre categories that are not recognised as part of the armed forces anywhere else in the world.Footnote 67 Pundits saw PiS’s sharp rhetorical efforts, disproportionate to the political decisions taken prior to 2022, as part of their political branding:
The ongoing election campaign focuses on what defense planning looked like under the previous government versus now … However, it must be acknowledged that the offensive arms program, including the ‘Polish Fangs’ initiative for HIMARS artillery and JASSM missiles, was first designed under Tusk government before 2015. (VI)
During the 2023 election campaign – amid defence spending reaching 3.9 per cent of GDP – the display of material capabilities became central to PiS’s domestic legitimisation. The military featured prominently, as leading party figures staged rallies and press conferences against the backdrop of newly acquired equipment, highlighting the performative dimension of populist security policy. Procurement decisions were framed to contrast sharply with the alleged weakness of previous governments, while obscuring that the decisive expansion had followed the shock of 2022.
Institutional dimension
The question of whether Poland altered its approach to international cooperation, professionalisation, and governance under PiS reveals a differentiated pattern across domestic and transnational arenas. In domestic institutional politics, the shift was clear and broadly consistent with our theoretical expectations: a weakening of traditional institutional compartmentalisation, increased personalisation of decision-making, and a visible marginalisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). In the realm of international organisations, however, the effects were more uneven. The most pronounced contestation concerned EU security cooperation, particularly sustained rhetorical attacks on the CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy). By contrast, cooperation within NATO remained largely loyal and institutionally stable. That said, this generalisation requires qualification. During the period of especially close relations with Trump, the PiS-led government opportunistically prioritised bilateral channels with Washington, sometimes without acknowledging that an expansion of US–Polish cooperation outside multilateral frameworks did not automatically reinforce NATO cohesion. Meanwhile, despite sharp rhetoric towards the EU and emotional escalations around CSDP initiatives, PiS governments did not systematically block concrete EU security policies when key decisions were taken. Moreover – consistent with long-standing Polish practice – they actively advocated additional sanctions packages against Russia within the EU framework. Finally, after 2022, when the EU assumed a central role in coordinating and financing support for Ukraine, the PiS-led government supported relevant formats. It also emerged as one of the earliest and most determined advocates of NATO and EU enlargement to include Ukraine.
NATO has been the cornerstone of Poland’s security policy since 1989, with accession in 1999 widely seen as a major foreign policy success.Footnote 68 Successive governments sought to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank, arguing that treaty guarantees required allied military presence in the region and concrete contingency planning against potential Russian aggression. Both PO/PSL and PiS largely converged in prioritising NATO over deeper EU defence integration. Poland consistently maintained that the CSDP should not duplicate NATO structures or weaken transatlantic ties. The divergence lay less in substance than in tone and framing. Whereas PO/PSL treated EU defence initiatives as complementary to NATO, PiS adopted a more confrontational stance, questioning the EU’s strategic credibility and portraying EU defence cooperation as a geopolitical alternative to the United States.Footnote 69 As one senior PiS security authority put it:
After 2007, the Polish political scene was divided between those who were permanently oriented towards the US as the NATO hegemon and actual provider of military security [PiS], and those who believed and publicly proclaimed that it was also necessary to rely on an additional insurance policy in the form of EU security structures [PO/PSL]. Since public opinion knows very little about the real military capabilities of the EU, this had a certain seductive power. And, indeed, it was a choice between a primarily American and a primarily German orientation. (VIII)
The first major step towards strengthening institutional guarantees for NATO’s eastern flank came after Russia’s aggression in Crimea and Donbas. At the 2014 Newport summit, the alliance shifted its focus from out-of-area operations towards deterrence, establishing a rapid reaction force (VJTF) and establishing the commitment of members to spend at least 2 per cent of GDP on defence – both long-standing Polish priorities. The 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw was a flagship objective for the new PiS government, intended to showcase Poland’s international effectiveness; to deliver it, they retained key career diplomats. PiS cast the summit as ‘historic’, highlighting NATO’s move towards a stronger forward presence on the eastern flank and a break with earlier restraint shaped by the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act.
The summit fundamentally changed Poland’s security situation and effectively rendered the NATO–Russia Act obsolete. This was made possible by the unprecedented, initially controversial, and emotionally charged creation of the B9 format. (XIX)
A key outcome of the summit was the rotational deployment of multinational battalions on NATO’s eastern flank, including in Poland – an allied presence widely seen as a crucial security commitment, with US participation.Footnote 70 The government promoted the B9 format as a platform for coordinating East-Central European positions within NATO, amplifying Warsaw’s influence through regional alignment. PiS portrayed the initiative as a diplomatic success and claimed credit for it, although it had originally been proposed by President Komorowski. While the summit was framed as transformative for Poland’s security status, this claim appears overstated given NATO’s strategic shift had already been underway since 2014 (IX).
Inflated rhetoric also shaped PiS’s approach to EU defence initiatives. The government adopted a confrontational tone towards the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), describing it as a threat to sovereignty and transatlantic ties. Yet this rhetoric contrasted with policy outcomes:
When discussions about PESCO began in 2017, the government sparked a toxic debate over the EU’s role in security. It claimed to defend American interests, even though the US supported EU–NATO cooperation. For a long time, we refused to confirm whether we would join PESCO. Ultimately, we did join, arguing that it … would strengthen EU–NATO cooperation. Moreover, in practice PESCO had little real impact and often overlapped with earlier industrial initiatives. So, what was the point of this whole dispute? (XVIII)
Under Trump, relations entered a phase of opportunistic cooperation marked by a greater emphasis on special ties with Washington. While this shift was not presented as occurring at NATO’s expense, it implicitly strengthened bilateral security arrangements alongside the alliance framework. Shared criticism of Germany – portrayed by both the Trump administration and PiS as a NATO free-rider with problematic ties to Russia – further reinforced this convergence.
Fulfilling NATO obligations was crucial. With Trump focused on burden sharing, our consistent 2 percent defence spending aligned with his priorities – unlike many wealthier free riders. (XIX)
After 2022, cooperation returned more clearly to NATO and multilateral security frameworks. Analysts aligned with PiS thinking argue that, compared with PO/PSL governments, this phase reflected a more pragmatic approach, with Poland seeking to act as an effective and self-confident partner within allied institutions rather than merely adapting to existing arrangements:
Our approach to Russia’s aggression in 2022 was more proactive than PO/PSL’s in 2014. Before 2015, Poland largely followed Berlin and Paris, using NATO membership passively. PiS, by contrast, treated international formats as instruments for advancing national interests, guided by the idea of a strong and sovereign Poland. This more assertive approach proved effective in wartime, positioning Poland as a recognized regional leader. While our predecessors hesitated amid uncertainty, in 2022 we pushed allies to act. (IV)
A senior diplomat affiliated with PO offers a sharply different assessment, pointing to what he describes as diplomatic bravado and declining professional competence:
The PO/PSL and PiS governments differed markedly in the skill with which they advanced Poland’s position. After 2015, there was clear regression. Despite ambitious transatlantic rhetoric, PiS pursued a one-dimensional policy focused on the US, neglecting multilateral engagement and exposing its weaknesses in public missteps, including on nuclear sharing. (V)
This episode illustrates the bold – and at times overreaching – style of policy-making that characterised PiS after Russia’s invasion. While Poland regained standing in Washington and pushed ambitious sanctions and aid for Ukraine, the government’s public suggestion of participation in NATO nuclear sharing proved overly audacious and was swiftly dismissed by the Biden administration.Footnote 71
At the same time, several interviewees pointed to PiS’s reluctance to promote Polish candidates to influential posts in international institutions, reflecting a broader inward-looking approach to foreign policy:
A highly qualified PiS-linked candidate was offered a chance to run for assistant to the NATO Secretary General. Aware that he needed support from his government, he ultimately chose not to run, knowing PiS would not back him.” (XIII)
Regarding the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations, PiS largely maintained the policies of previous governments but showed limited interest in these forums. Analysts associated with the party argued that, amid the broader crisis of the rules-based international order, the relevance of such institutions was declining, and that Poland should approach them with greater realism. At the same time, Warsaw continued to comply with international norms governing the use of force and disarmament, while emphasising that their effectiveness was increasingly undermined by Russia’s persistent non-compliance (XVIII).
Jacek Czaputowicz, former minister of foreign affairs in the PiS government and a prominent IR professor, noted that most multilateral formats were dismissed or ignored by PiS leaders, so Czaputowicz was granted relative autonomy in managing them.Footnote 72 Yet the MFA’s marginal role meant initiatives like Poland’s UN Security CouncilFootnote 73 seat or OSCE presidency remained peripheral, lacking strategic guidance from the top:
I disagreed with most PiS politicians not on goals, but on how foreign policy should be conducted, which is why I left. I believe in multilateralism, international law, and alliance-building. Much was handled incompetently; few understood the OSCE or the complexities of European integration, which paradoxically gave me more room to act. Short-term electoral gains often took precedence over long-term strategy. (II)
This highlights how PiS led institutional reforms that emphasised the centralisation and personalisation of policy-making at the expense of career diplomats and national security experts. Notably, the MFA lost influence under PiS rule, with its ministers holding weak positions in government. As Interviewee XXI put it: ‘The MFA ended up basically handling bilateral relations and putting out fires caused by domestic politics.’ Its Security Policy Department was sidelined, while three EU-related departments were moved to the Chancellery of Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki. Contingent factors often decided about the division of competencies between various institutions: ‘since Duda had some “chemistry” with Trump, it was decided that relations with the US should be managed by the President’s office’ (Interviewee XXI). Meanwhile, the MoD gained significant clout, especially since 2022. Led by Mariusz Błaszczak, a senior PiS figure and deputy party leader, it emerged as a central actor, benefiting from a substantial budget increase. Still, officials from other parts of the administration pointed to the MoD’s lack of diplomatic skill and limited communication and cooperation with other government bodies:
The MoD traditionally focused on defence, while security policy was the domain of the MFA. Not anymore: while the MFA should assign tasks to our ambassador to NATO, in practice this is often done by the MoD or the President’s Chancellery. Coordinating security policy has become increasingly difficult – the MFA is formally responsible but lacks the authority to ensure interministerial compliance. (IX)
Despite centralising power and maintaining for an unprecedented eight years complete control over the parliament, government, and presidency, the PiS government struggled to coordinate security policy effectively. The exception to this was the brief period following the outbreak of war in 2022, when, driven by a sense of urgency, while taking advantage of the fact that Kaczyński was deputy prime minister for security, Poland provided substantial aid to Ukraine and succeeded in getting its arguments across to Western partners.Footnote 74 In March 2022, during a visit to Kyiv, Kaczyński and Morawiecki proposed the creation of an international peacekeeping mission to Ukraine, operating under a NATO or broader mandate. The mission was intended to protect civilians and deliver humanitarian aid, but it was met with scepticism by Western allies and ultimately not implemented.Footnote 75 Interviewees of different political backgrounds highlighted coordination challenges resulting from PiS’s institutional changes:
Overall, Polish foreign policy is a complete mess at the institutional level. Especially when it comes to coordination between the three main decision-making bodies: the Prime Minister’s Chancellery, the MFA, and the President. (III)
In sum, Poland’s cooperation with multilateral institutions showed continuity under PiS, with a clear prioritisation of NATO. While PiS verbally attacked the EU’s role in security policy, these criticisms were not followed by concrete actions reversing previous commitments. After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the EU emerged as a key platform for military assistance to Kyiv, with Poland supporting these efforts and the broader sanctions regime. Aside from the episode of bilateral enthusiasm with the United States under Trump’s presidency, PiS did not challenge core international frameworks promoting professionalisation and governance in security. In contrast, multilateral bodies lacking strong public support were largely met with indifference by the PiS government. In domestic institutions, increasing personalisation and de-professionalisation hindered effectiveness and inter-institutional cooperation.
Operational dimension
This section examines whether the PiS government exhibited a greater propensity to employ military tools in responding to conflicts and managing potential escalations with direct or indirect adversaries. The evidence does not clearly support this hypothesis. Although PiS consistently claimed to prioritise defence and deterrence more than its predecessors, it was primarily external crises that propelled the growing role of the armed forces amid rising regional tensions. The response to the Belarus border crisis might suggest heightened militarisation, yet non-populist governments in the region that faced similar hybrid attacks responded in comparable ways. Furthermore, the centre-left coalition that took office in December 2023 implemented a similar security approach, reflecting continuity rather than a major shift.
Poland has positioned itself as not only a state committed to investing in defence but also one unafraid to use military force when necessary. A key PiS security expert draws an analogy with the period following the September 11 attacks, when the post-communist government deployed Polish troops in Afghanistan as part of a US-led mission, arguing this posture reflects a long-standing element of Poland’s strategic culture, rather than a unique PiS-driven inclination towards the use of force:
Poland has consistently shown its commitment to using armed forces when necessary. A good example is our participation in the Baltic Air Policing mission. During the German tour, Russian planes constantly flew over the Baltics unchallenged. However, during the Polish tour, the Russians refrained from testing the Poles, as they knew the response would be: ‘we shoot, just like we did in Afghanistan’. (VIII)
That said, the PiS government often portrayed itself as more willing to rely on the armed forces than previous administrations. Even prior to 2022 war, the controversial defence minister, Antoni Macierewicz – aligned with PiS’s right-wing faction – sought to reshuffle military leadership to tighten political control. He also established the Territorial Defence Forces, which were initially met with strong controversies.
Our leaders love posing with the military, projecting an image of unity. But behind the scenes, tensions exist. Under Macierewicz, some officers, including generals with differing views, were purged. Those who agreed or stayed quiet remained. While the army’s interests broadly align with PiS, the former never became fully partisan, and Macierewicz failed to control it. (I)
From 2020 onward, the role of the armed forces in Poland expanded in response to a series of external crises, beginning with the COVID-19 pandemic and followed by the border crisis with Belarus (XX). The latter started in 2021, when Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, following a domestic crackdown on protesters, orchestrated waves of irregular migration targeting Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Finland. Leveraging its security apparatus, the Belarusian regime opened migration routes from the Middle East. The PiS government responded with mobilising the Border Guard and the army, while initiating the building of a border wall and adopting a harsh anti-immigrant rhetoric.Footnote 76 Additionally, it restricted access for international observers, the media, and FRONTEX. These actions drew heavy criticism from Polish and international civil society groups over the use of pushbacks and other tactics linked to at least thirty-seven documented migrant deaths on Polish territory before the change of government in December 2023.Footnote 77
The crisis response reflects a tendency to employ military means for conflict resolution, yet reactively. Moreover, non-populist governments in Latvia and Lithuania adopted similar approaches when faced with comparable hybrid threats. Poland’s new centre-left government since December 2023 has likewise made few substantive changes to crisis management practices, disappointing many activists. While it claims that migrants can apply for asylum, human rights groups report continued pushbacks.Footnote 78 In February 2025, the Tusk administration introduced legislation permitting the temporary suspension of asylum rights. Although the number of documented fatalities declined compared to the preceding period, at least eleven migrant deaths have been documented on Polish territory since the alternation of power, while four additional cases cannot be conclusively assigned to either period because the date of death remains uncertain.Footnote 79 Official rhetoric has nevertheless become less confrontational, even though the intensity of the crisis had already begun to decline by late 2023.
Similarly, considering military strategy towards Russia, it was the 2022 invasion of Ukraine that eventually prompted Poland to adopt an ‘offensive defence’ posture:
2022 was a turning point. It reinforced the belief that Russia must not be allowed to enter Polish territory. Ukraine, limited to defending itself within its own borders due to Western concerns, is at a disadvantage. There’s growing recognition that in the event of an attack, Poland would need to respond offensively, targeting capabilities in Kaliningrad or Belarus. The message is clear: this war would not be fought solely on Polish soil. (VI)
Overall, there is little evidence to suggest that the PiS government pursued exceptional militarisation. What stands out instead is its instrumentalisation of crises for domestic political messaging, marked by highly antagonistic rhetoric, fake news, and restricted access for media and aid organisations. Within PiS-affiliated circles, Poland’s high defence spending and expressed willingness to use military force in the event of an attack were viewed as the foundation for cultivating a special strategic relationship with Washington:
Poland’s armament shows its political will to be a key security player on the eastern flank, and this reflects national consensus. If the US seeks a capable and willing ally – not necessarily the strongest, but one ready to act – Poland fits that role. Unlike Germany, which lacks that will, Poland can ease America’s burden and help stabilize the region. (VIII)
Although PiS emphasised military strength and readiness rhetorically, military actions were largely reactive. Similar responses from non-populist governments, coupled with policy continuity under the new administration, suggest that beyond rhetoric, there was limited substantive shift in military strategy specifically attributable to PiS.
Ideational dimension
This section focuses on the ideational dimension of populism, exploring whether the PiS government actively sought to reshape perceptions of threat by encouraging the radicalisation of policies in response. The pattern here was uneven. Towards Russia, PiS largely continued the long-standing consensus treating Moscow as Poland’s primary external threat. In contrast, it adopted a far more confrontational stance towards Germany and elevated the figure of an internal enemy in Donald Tusk, portrayed as serving foreign interests.
Polish governments have traditionally emphasised the threat posed by Russia and voiced concern over the close political and economic ties between Western European elites and Moscow. Like other countries on NATO’s eastern flank, Polish society has at times been accused of overreacting emotionally or exhibiting Russophobia. However, after 2022 a broader political consensus emerged in Europe, affirming that countries bordering Russia had correctly anticipated the nature of the threat. Thus, PiS’s anti-Russian stance was neither novel nor particularly controversial:
Those who work professionally in the field see mostly continuity in Polish security policy, the ‘political dimension’ is there to stir emotions, but it almost never reflects practical actions. (X)
What marked a clear departure was the deliberate framing of Germany as an adversary, portraying Berlin as constantly seeking to undermine Polish sovereignty.Footnote 80 This antagonistic rhetoric, primarily aimed at domestic audiences, did not disrupt operational cooperation on NATO’s joint exercises, but it did complicate allied communication and, to some extent, affected Poland’s security environment. On substantive matters, however, PiS ultimately softened its position – most notably by initially rejecting, then later accepting, the deployment of German Patriot missile defence systems to counter threats from the east.
Another notable shift was the radical climate of conspiracy and permanent crisis constructed around a domestic enemy. The former prime minister Tusk became the target of PiS’s most aggressive propaganda, accused of treason and collusion with Russia and Germany. As a former close ally of Angela Merkel, Tusk was cast as a conduit for allegedly treacherous European elites whose interests were portrayed as aligned with Moscow.Footnote 81 This escalation, aimed at excluding Tusk from public life, might well have succeeded were it not for the firm intervention of the Biden administration, whose leverage was then strong given the pivotal US role in ensuring Poland’s security. While both PO/PSL and PiS consistently viewed Russia as a key threat, PiS portrayed Tusk’s camp as covertly pro-Russian. This narrative peaked during the 2023 electoral campaign, accusing Tusk of secret dealings with Putin while linking him to the 2010 Smolensk crash that killed President Kaczyński and ninety-five members of Poland’s elite. State media amplified this conspiratorial framing through the Reset series, overlooking broader Western efforts at rapprochement with Russia under President Obama.
The peak of the electoral politicisation of Tusk and the military came in mid-September, shortly before the elections. Defence Minister Błaszczak publicly disclosed part of a classified 2011 defence plan approved by the PO/PSL government. He claimed the document revealed that Tusk’s government had designated the Vistula river as Poland’s primary defence line, suggesting that eastern Poland was effectively abandoned to Russian occupation.
So now the Minister is telling us we used to defend ourselves at the Vistula? And now, excuse me, we’re supposed to defend ourselves at the Bug? This isn’t Verdun, it’s not World War I. (XV)
This narrative reinforced the recurring theme of a conspiracy between Tusk and Putin, allegedly aimed at preventing the defence of eastern regions, disproportionately populated by PiS’s ‘patriotic’ voter base. In reality, Błaszczak referenced only one scenario from a much broader plan. This unprecedented politicisation of national security drew sharp criticism from former military leaders. Just three weeks later, and only six days before the election, two of Poland’s top military commanders resigned, a move widely interpreted as a protest against PiS’s politicisation of defence.
Furthermore, Tusk was frequently depicted by PiS as Berlin’s asset, allegedly cooperating with Germany to undermine Poland. A central symbol of this propaganda was a heavily edited clip from a speech Tusk gave at a meeting of the German Christian Democrats, in which he said ‘Für Deutschland’. Public television manipulated the footage to cast Tusk in a sinister light, broadcasting the altered clip more than 200 times on its flagship evening news programme between his return to Polish politics in the summer of 2021 and the 2023 elections.Footnote 82 An experienced diplomat and security expert – who in the past expressed sympathies for PiS – noted:
Diplomacy is about getting from point A to point B. PiS doesn’t think about how to get there; it just wants to be at point B. If it can’t get there, it starts arguing. They don’t do diplomacy. Diplomacy is about winning allies, being tough in substance but soft in form. PiS doesn’t know how to be soft … PiS lives under the illusion that you can be both anti-Western and anti-Russian at the same time, and that’s their biggest problem. (XVII)
Finally, it is worth noting that no territorial revisionist discourse has gained traction in Poland, nor has there been any challenge to the country’s post-1945 borders. After 1945, Poland lost its eastern territories to the USSR but was compensated with lands at the expense of defeated Germany. Unlike Hungary, where nationalist discourse often nostalgically evokes territories lost under the Treaty of Trianon, such claims have not been promoted in Poland. On the contrary, Polish political forces, especially on the right, remained acutely sensitive to extremist groups in Germany and were wary of any resurgence in revisionist sentiment regarding the approximately 20 per cent of former German territory now within Poland’s borders. This sensitivity effectively precluded cooperation with Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland. Before elections in 2023, however, PiS launched a campaign claiming that Germany owes Poland reparations amounting to 1.4 trillion euros – equivalent to about 125 per cent of the entire EU budget for 2021–7. This can be interpreted as a form of revisionism, since legally the issue was settled at the Potsdam Conference, even though the USSR appropriated reparations that were due to Poland. Interestingly, PiS has not demanded reparations from Russia for the damages suffered during World War II, nor has it sought compensation for the seized reparations that were originally paid by Germany.
Conclusions
This study has explored the complex interplay between populism and security policy under Poland’s Law and Justice government (PiS), focusing on five interrelated dimensions: geopolitical, material, institutional, operational, and ideational. Drawing on evidence from official documents, secondary sources, and twenty-eight anonymised in-depth expert interviews, the findings reveal a nuanced picture in which PiS’s antagonistic rhetoric often coexisted with substantial policy continuities and largely reactive security postures shaped by external regional dynamics. The evidence suggests that PiS’s populist rhetoric functioned primarily as a tool for mobilising electoral support and consolidating power rather than as a driver of novel security policy shifts. The distinctiveness of PiS’s approach lays less in the substance of threat perceptions than in the style and intensity of their public articulation. These discursive practices were mediated by structural and contextual constraints, which in turn conditioned the extent to which confrontational rhetoric could be translated into tangible security policies.
Indeed, PiS’s government reshaped the ideational landscape by fusing traditional security concerns with domestic political warfare, linking foreign adversaries and domestic political opponents in a conspiratorial narrative that fuels polarisation. While the threat from Russia remained the central focus for defence investment and deterrence policies – amplified by events in Ukraine – PiS expanded the threat horizon to encompass Germany as a geopolitical rival seeking to undermine Polish sovereignty, despite their deep economic and security ties. Additionally, it portrayed Tusk and his allies as ‘enemies within’, in a conspiratorial narrative that gained unprecedented prominence in public discourse. The party’s approach deviated from the diplomatic norms of coalition-building and pragmatic alliance management, favouring contentious rhetoric and a zero-sum view of international interactions. Moreover, the deployment of state resources, including the creation of investigative commissions and the politicisation of intelligence and media, blurred lines between security policy and partisan warfare. This climate of radicalisation, conspiracy, and drama contributed to intensified polarisation, undermining trust in democratic institutions and often complicating Poland’s diplomatic posture. The politicisation of defence strategy in the electoral context provoked institutional backlash and exposed risks to military professionalism and democratic standards of civil–military relations.
While PiS has sharply intensified the politicisation of security threats – both domestic and foreign – it has not fundamentally altered Poland’s security policy-making, which remains anchored in NATO and close ties with the United States. Despite its aggressive rhetoric, PiS’s threat narratives largely revived long-standing Polish anxieties, especially anti-Russian sentiments shared across the political spectrum and reinforced by the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. The party tapped into a deep-seated fear, rooted in the eighteenth-century partitions and World War II, of Poland trapped between Germany and Russia. In doing so, it challenged the post-1989 narrative of reconciliation with Germany and replaced it with a vision of renewed geopolitical peril.
Despite PiS’s emphasis on strength and deterrence, there is little evidence of exceptional militarisation. Its rule was marked more by the instrumentalisation of crises for antagonistic communication than by substantive policy change. Security adjustments largely responded to external events, with defence spending increases being reactive rather than strategic. Although crises such as the Belarus border standoff and the pandemic expanded the military’s domestic role – through troop mobilisation, border walls, and strict immigration controls – similar patterns appeared in non-populist states. Likewise, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, rather than PiS’s unique agenda, drove Poland’s shift towards an ‘offensive defence’ posture. The continuity under the subsequent centre-left government confirms that while PiS radicalised rhetoric, its successors have sustained core security policies. Crucially, despite this radicalisation, Poland has refrained from substantial territorial revisionism regarding its post-war borders.
That said, PiS remains a powerful force in Polish politics, as evidenced by the June 2025 presidential elections. Its potential return to power could bring more radical policies in the security domain. Populism has already deepened polarisation, weakened institutions, and politicised (inter)national security, threatening democratic governance and social cohesion. The fusion of propaganda with state security blurs accountability and undermines effective policy-making.
More generally, PiS’s tenure illustrates the ambivalent impact of populism on security policy: while populist rhetoric can mobilise support and shape national identity through threat perceptions, its ability to redefine state strategy remains limited by geopolitical constraints, institutional resilience, and societal consensus. Time, space, and governing structures are thus decisive in the ability of populist governments to enact (or not) significant policy change. Hence, while populist governments display distinct patterns in security policy-making, their transformative potential depends on how effectively domestic and international actors contain radicalisation over time. Mitigation efforts should therefore focus on strengthening institutions, civic education, and regional and international commitments to democratic governance.Footnote 83
The complexity of the insights derived from the Polish case – initially expected to be an ‘easy case’ for the theory – underscores the need for further theorising in IR on the conditions under which populist leaderships are able to exert greater influence over security policy. Furthermore, it is worth recalling that the purpose of an in-depth single-case study such as this is not to derive universal claims about the populism–security nexus. Rather, the Polish case primarily serves as a plausibility probe and as a foundation for future comparative research across different geographical and ideological variants of populism. Future research should also examine these dynamics through systematic comparative case studies of both populist and non-populist governments, thereby strengthening the generalisability of the proposed five-dimensional framework while accounting for variation in domestic and international constraints. More extensive and diverse empirical evidence of this kind can foster a more policy-oriented understanding of the scope, limits, and consequences of populist governments’ impact on international (in-)security.
Acknowledgements
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2025 European Workshops in International Studies. We thank the editor and the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful and constructive feedback. Anna Wojciuk is particularly indebted to Szymon Kardaś for his insightful consultations, to Mariola Chudzik for her organisational support throughout the project, and, above all, to all interviewees for generously sharing their time and insights.
Funding statement
Daniel F. Wajner acknowledges support from the Israel Science Foundation through the research grant Populism and International (In-)Security (No. 2450/22).
Anna Wojciuk acknowledges support from the Polish National Science Centre through the research grant Semiperipheral Populists as Decision Makers in International Relations (UMO-2021/42/E/HS5/00029).
Ethical Considerations
The study received approval from the University of Warsaw Rector’s Committee for Research Involving Human Participants (No. 227/2023). All participants were provided with detailed information about the purpose of the study, the voluntary nature of participation, and the use of the collected data. Each participant could choose to respond anonymously or to be identified by name; statements provided under the participant’s name were authorised in accordance with principles analogous to press law. Participants were allowed to withdraw their consent at any stage of the project, including after the interviews had been conducted and anonymised. Written consents are held by the university conducting the study.
Daniel F. Wajner is an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations and the European Forum at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His research focuses on international legitimacy, conflict resolution, regional integration, and populist foreign policy, with an emphasis on their interplay in the realm of European, Latin American, and Middle Eastern politics. His recent academic work has appeared in the Journal of European Integration, International Studies Review, International Affairs, International Studies Quarterly, Comparative European Politics, Journal of Global Security Studies, and Globalizations. He was the co-editor of a 2024 special section in International Affairs on ‘The Effects of Global Populism’. He also co-edited the volume Populist Foreign Policy: Regional Perspectives of Populism in the International Scene (Springer, 2023).
Anna Wojciuk is a professor at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw. Her research focuses on right-wing populism, democracy, constitutional politics, and the role of ideas and education in world politics, with an emphasis on their interplay in international relations and comparative politics. Her recent academic work has appeared in Review of International Studies, Political Geography, Journal of International Relations and Development, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, and European Political Science. She is the author of Empires of Knowledge (Routledge, 2018) and co-editor of Let’s Agree on Poland: A Case Study in Strategic Constitutional Design (Oxford University Press, 2025). She has held visiting appointments at Harvard University, Columbia University, Cornell University, and the European University Institute.
Appendix A
Interviews:
I. Experienced security analyst from government think-tank, 28 July 2023.
II. Jacek Czaputowicz, minister of foreign affairs 2018–20, deputy minister of foreign affairs 2017–18, professor of international relations, 24 August 2023.
III. Top level analytical staff, government think-tank, 24 August 2023.
IV. Diplomat, top level decision maker at the Chancellery of President Duda, 28 August 2023.
V. Top level diplomat, former vice-minister serving under PO, security expert, 30 August 2023.
VI. Experienced security analyst from government think-tank, 1 September 2023.
VII. Retired very high-level military and diplomat who worked with all Polish governments in the last thirty-five years, 6 October 2023.
VIII. Public intellectual specialising in security, advisor to top level decision makers from PiS, 18 October 2023.
IX. Very senior security expert, advisor to the PiS who impacted their policies, 23 October 2023.
X. Experienced security analyst from government think-tank, 6 November 2023.
XI. Top level career diplomat who since 1989 worked with all Polish governments, including closely with PiS, 8 November 2023.
XII. Scholar and right-wing public intellectual specialising in security policy, 8 November 2023.
XIII. Former military and diplomat, civil servant in the MoD, 18 November 2023.
XIV. Former military and high-level diplomat under PO, 20 November 2023.
XV. Top level military who served under PiS, 6 December 2023.
XVI. Senior career diplomat and civil servant in the MFA, worked closely with PiS decision makers, 8 December 2023.
XVII. Former very high-level diplomat connected with intelligence, specialising in post-Soviet area, in the past supportive for PiS, 16 December 2023.
XVIII. Leading security expert in a government think-tank, 18 December 2023.
XIX. PiS politician, diplomat, and top-level decision maker at the Chancellery of President Duda, 3 January 2024.
XX. Top level military who served under PiS, 4 January 2024.
XXI. Highly experienced foreign and security expert (NGO sector), in the last twenty-five years worked with all Polish governments, 1 March 2024.
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