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Comparing blunders in government

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2026

Will Jennings
Affiliation:
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Southampton, UK
Martin Lodge*
Affiliation:
Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
Matt Ryan
Affiliation:
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Southampton, UK
*
Address for correspondence: Martin Lodge, Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK. E‐mail: M.Lodge@lse.ac.uk

Abstract

Much attention has been paid to government ‘blunders’ and ‘policy disasters’. National political and administrative systems have been frequently blamed for being disproportionately prone to generating mishaps. However, little systematic evidence exists on the record of failures of policies and major public projects in other political systems. Based on a comparative perspective on blunders in government, this article suggests that constitutional features do not play a prominent role. In order to establish this finding, this article (a) develops theory‐driven expectations as to the factors that are said to encourage blunders, (b) devises a systematic framework for the assessment of policy processes and outcomes, and (c) uses fuzzy‐set qualitative comparative analysis to identify sets of causal conditions associated with particular outcomes (i.e., blunders). The article applies this novel approach to a set of particular policy domains, finding that constitutional features are not a contributory factor to blunders in contrast to instrument choice, administrative capacity and hyper‐excited politics.

Information

Type
Original Articles
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 European Consortium for Political Research

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