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Dominant players and minimum size coalitions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2026

A.M.A. Van Deemen*
Affiliation:
Catholic University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands

Abstract

In this paper we present a result about Peleg's theory of coalition formation in dominated simple games (Peleg 1981). Further, a connection between Peleg's theory and Riker's minimum size theory (Riker 1962, Riker and Ordeshook 1973) is established. This connection leads to a new theory of coalition formation in simple games.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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