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Patterns of democracy reconsidered: The ambiguous relationship between corporatism and consensualism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2026

Marco Giuliani
Marco Giuliani*
Affiliation:
Dipartimento di scienze sociali e politiche, Università degli studi di Milano, Italy
*
Address for correspondence:Marco Giuliani, Dipartimento di scienze sociali e politiche, Università degli studi di Milano, Via Conservatorio 7, 20122 Milano, Italy. Tel.: +39 02 50321210; E‐mail: marco.giuliani@unimi.it
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Abstract

Arend Lijphart's Patterns of Democracy, similar to most of his work, elicited fierce scientific debate. This article replicates some of the analyses proposed in its second edition (published in 2012) in the light of the critiques received by the first edition (published in 2009). It primarily examines the relationship between institutional setup and interest group representation, disentangling the effect of consensualism from that of corporatism on issues such as macroeconomic performance and governance capabilities. The article further deepens our understanding of the complex causal mechanisms connecting these variables, proposing a more sophisticated empirical investigation that emphasises selection effects and conjunctural causation.

Keywords

democracyconsensualismcorporativismperformancereplication

Information

Type
Original Articles
Information
European Journal of Political Research , Volume 55 , Issue 1 , February 2016 , pp. 22 - 42
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 European Consortium for Political Research

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