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Representation or abdication? How citizens use institutions to help delegation succeed

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2026

Arthur Lupia*
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego, USA
Mathew D. McCubbins
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego, USA
*
Address for Offprints: Arthur Lupia, Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, California 92093‐0521, USA Phone: +1 858 534 5799; Fax: +1 858 534 7130; E‐mail: alupia@weber.ucsd.edu

Abstract

Modern democracy requires delegation. One problem with delegation is that principals and agents often have conflicting interests. A second problem is that principals lack information about their agents. Many scholars conclude that these problems cause delegation to become abdication. We reject this conclusion and introduce a theory of delegation that supports a different conclusion. The theory clarifies when interest conflicts and information problems do (and do not) turn delegation into abdication. We conclude by arguing that remedies for common delegation problems can be embedded in the design of electoral, legislative, and bureaucratic institutions. The culmination of our efforts is a simple, but general, statement about when citizens and legislators can (and cannot) control their agents.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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