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Beyond Judicialization: Why We Need More Comparative Research About Constitutional Courts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2026

Christoph Hönnige
Christoph Hönnige*
Affiliation:
Technische Universität Kaiserslautern, Erwin-Schroedinger-Straße 57/480, Kaiserslautern, D-67653, Germany
*
E-mail: hoennige@sowi.uni-kl.de
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Abstract

Constitutional courts play an increasing role in policymaking and the concepts of comparative politics. Traditionally, research has focused on the Judicialization hypothesis for European courts. This article argues that there is a major research gap regarding justices’ preferences, intra- and inter-institutional rules and that it is necessary to move beyond the Judicialization hypothesis to integrate courts in concepts of comparative politics. It outlines four theoretical and methodological challenges for future research on constitutional courts.

Keywords

comparative politicsconstitutional courtsjudicialization

Information

Type
Research
Information
European Political Science , Volume 10 , Issue 3 , September 2011, pp. 346 - 358
Copyright
Copyright © European Consortium for Political Research 2010

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