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Deliberative Lies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2026

Robert E. Goodin*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia

Abstract

Deliberative democrats enjoin participants in ideal speech situations never to lie. But game theorists show that people can have purely truth-based motives for strategically misrepresenting information they hold privately when they are deliberating with others. If deliberative democrats want to ensure that every participant in the deliberation fully and truthfully reveals to one another all private information that they hold, that sets some stringent requirements for the nature of the group that deliberates together.

Information

Type
Debate
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 European Consortium for Political Research

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