Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-tnkh4 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T18:00:59.110Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Poor Governance in a Very Rich and Advanced (Micro)State: Reflections from Political Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2026

Bent Sofus Tranøy*
Affiliation:
Institute for Social Sciences, Hedmark University College, Campus Rena, PO Box 400, Elverum NO-2418, Norway

Abstract

In addition to introducing and contextualizing the four other contributions to this symposium, this article makes three arguments. Firstly, the Icelandic case has shown up severe weaknesses in the internal market for financial services, including liquidity risk regulation and intergovernmental conflict resolution mechanisms. Echoing Scharpf's analysis of EU decision making, a deep asymmetry has been revealed: It was much easier to grant actors access to each other's domestic markets than to create a pan-European financial regulation creating a clear division of responsibilities and the ability to pool resources and share burdens. The second argument is that political economy has developed a supply-side bias. This has decreased attention to the mechanisms that inject instability into economic performance at the macro level and distribute risk and instability at the level of households and firms. The third point made is that while spectacular boom and bust cycles (reasonably) strengthen the case for less rationalistic micro foundations in the study of economic behaviour, this also entails the risk of losing sight of how perfectly rational (but immoral) financial actors take advantage of their less savvy counterparties – be they creditors, shareholders or taxpayers. The article concludes that financial stability is ultimately about governance and therefore about power.

Information

Type
Symposium
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 European Consortium for Political Research

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable