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Vulnerability and Compensation: Constructing an Index of Co-Optation in Autocratic Regimes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2026

Alexander Schmotz*
Affiliation:
Department of War Studies, King’s College London, Strand, London, WC2R 2LS, UK

Abstract

Co-optation is one of the most important concepts that have been discussed in recent years to explain the persistence of autocratic regimes. Institutions like parties, legislatures, and elections have all been shown to fulfil a co-optation function. However, a broader assessment of co-optation beyond an institutional focus has yet to be undertaken. This article addresses this lacuna and presents a comprehensive concept and operationalisation of co-optation in autocratic regimes. The article argues that co-optation is constituted by the compensation of the regime’s vulnerability to threats posed by powerful societal pressure groups. The article highlights how compensation of vulnerability can be achieved through institutional inclusion or material benefits, and how this has to be tailored to the respective pressure group’s requirements. I collect twenty-six indicators of vulnerability and compensation related to six societal pressure groups and aggregate them into an index of co-optation that reflects the structure of the theoretical concept. The index is evaluated by examining distributions within and across categories of autocratic legislatures, and by testing its effect on autocratic regime breakdown in a set of Cox survival models.

Information

Type
Research
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 European Consortium for Political Research.

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