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Bidding ‘as if’ risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Tibor Neugebauer*
Affiliation:
Institut für Finanzmarkttheorie, Universität Hannover, Königsworther Platz 1, 30167 Hannover, Germany
Javier Perote
Affiliation:
Dpto. de Economía Aplicada II y Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Campus de Vicálvaro, 28032 Madrid, Spain

Abstract

Experimental research on first price sealed bid auctions has usually involved repeated settings with information feedback on winning bids and payoffs after each auction round. Relative to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium, significantly higher bidding has been reported. The present paper reports the results of experimental first price auctions with n = 7 where feedback on payoffs and winning bids is withheld. Under these conditions, average bidding is below the risk neutral Nash equilibrium prediction but converges to it with repetition.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2007 Economic Science Association

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