Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-wxvwp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-14T08:49:29.618Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Classification of natural language messages using a coordination game

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Daniel Houser and
Erte Xiao
Daniel Houser*
Affiliation:
George Mason University, Fairfax, USA
Erte Xiao*
Affiliation:
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA
*
e-mail: dhouser@gmu.edu
e-mail: exiao@andrew.cmu.edu
Get accessRights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The role of natural language communication in economic exchange has been the focus of substantial experimental analysis. Recently, scholars have taken the important step of investigating whether certain types of communication (e.g., promises) might affect decisions differently than other types of communication. This requires classifying natural language messages. Unfortunately, no broadly-accepted method is available for this purpose. We here describe a coordination game for classification of natural language messages. The game is similar in spirit to the “ESP” game that has proven successful for the classification of tens of millions of internet images. We compare our approach to self-classification as well as to classifications based on a standard content analysis. We argue that our classification game has advantages over those alternative approaches, and that these advantages might stem from the salient rewards earned by our game's participants.

Keywords

Classification gameNatural languageMessagesCoordination gameExperimental methods

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 14 , Issue 1 , March 2011, pp. 1 - 14
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi: 10.1007/s10683-010-9254-4) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

References

Ben-Ner, A., Putterman, L., & Ren, T. (2007). Lavish returns on cheap talk: non-binding communication in a trust experiment. Mimeo.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brandts, J., & Cooper, D. (2007). It's what you say, not what you pay: an experimental study of manager- employee relationships in overcoming coordination failure. Journal of the European Economic Association, 5(6), 1223–1268.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral game theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Cason, T., & Mui, V.-L. (2007). Communication and coordination in the laboratory collective resistance game. Experimental Economics, 10, 251–267.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cason, T., & Mui, V.-L. (2010). Coordinating resistance through communication and repeated interaction. Working paper, Purdue University.Google Scholar
Charness, G., & Dufwenberg, M. (2006). Promises and partnership. Econometrica, 74(6), 1579–1601.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Charness, G., & Dufwenberg, M. (2010). Bare promises. Economics Letters, 107, 281–283.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cooper, D., & Kagel, J. (2005). Are two heads better than one? Team versus individual play in signaling games. American Economic Review, 95(3), 477–509.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Corazzini, L., Kubez, S., Maréchal, M.A., & Nicolóx, A. (2009). Elections and deceptions: theory and experimental evidence. Working paper.Google Scholar
Crawford, V. (1997). Theory and experiment in the analysis of strategic interactions. In Kreps, D. & Wallis, K. (Eds.), Advances in economics and econometrics: theory and applications. Seventh world congress (Vol. I). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Dawes, R. M., McTavish, J., & Shaklee, H. (1977). Behavior communication and assumptions about other people's behavior in a commons dilemma situation. Personality and Social Psychology, 35(1), 1–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ellingsen, T., & Johannesson, M. (2007). Anticipated verbal feedback induces altruistic behavior. Evolution and Human Behavior. doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.11.001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Engle-Warnick, J., & Soroka, S.N. (2009). Harnessing the power of focal points to measure social agreement. Working Paper.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Epstein, J. (2007). Generative social science. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Feiler, L., & Camerer, C. (2009). Code creation in endogenous merger experiments. Economic inquiry, 48(2), 337–352.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fouraker, L., & Sigel, S. (1963). Bargaining behavior. New York: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
Hennig-Schmidt, H., Li, Z.-Y, & Yang, C. (2008). Why people reject advantageous offers—non-monotone strategies in ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 65, 373–384.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holt, C. (1995). Industrial organization: a survey of laboratory research. In Kagel, J. & Roth, A. E. (Eds.), The handbook of experimental economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Houser, D., & Wooders, J. (2006). Reputation in auctions: theory, and evidence from eBay. Journal of Economics and Management Science. doi:10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00103.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Houser, D., Keane, M., & McCabe, K. (2004). Behavior in a dynamic decision problem: an analysis of experimental evidence using a Bayesian type classification algorithm. Econometrica, 72(3), 781822.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Issac, R. M., & Walker, J. (1988). Communication and free riding behavior: the voluntary contributions mechanism. Economic inquiry 26. doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1988.tb01519.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kimbrough, E., Smith, V., & Wilson, B. (2008). Historical property rights, sociality, and the emergence of impersonal exchange in long distance trade. American Economic Review. doi: 10.1257/aer.98.3.1009.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krippendorff, K. (2004). Content analysis: an introduction to its methodology (2nd edn.). Thousand Oaks: Sage.Google Scholar
Luce, R. D., & Raiffa, H. (1957). Games and decisions: introduction and critical survey. New York: Wiley.Google Scholar
Ledyard, J. O. (1995). Public goods: a survey of experimental research. In Kagel, J. & Roth, A. E. (Eds.), The handbook of experimental economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Ochs, J. (1995). Coordination problems. In Kagel, J. & Roth, A. E. (Eds.), The handbook of experimental economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Schotter, A., & Sopher, B. (2007). Advice and behavior in intergenerational ultimatum games: an experimental approach. Games and Economic Behavior, 58, 365–393.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, V. (1962). An experimental study of competitive market behavior. Journal of Political Economy, 70(2), 111–137.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sutter, M., & Strassmair, C. (2009). Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments—an experimental study. Games and Economic Behavior, 66, 506–525.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
von Ahn, L. (2005). Games with purpose. PhD Dissertation, Carnegie Mellon University.Google Scholar
von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Xiao, E., & Houser, D. (2005). Emotion expression in human punishment behavior. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 102(20), 7398–7401.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Xiao, E., & Houser, D. (2007). Emotion expression and fairness in economic exchange. Manuscript, George Mason University.Google Scholar
Supplementary material: File

Houser and Xiao supplementary material

Appendix: Transcript of Instructions to Subjects
Download Houser and Xiao supplementary material(File)
File 54.4 KB