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A comparison of first price multi-object auctions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Katerina Sherstyuk
Katerina Sherstyuk*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2424 Maile Way, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA
*
e-mail: katyas@hawaii.edu
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Abstract

We compare simultaneous multi-object English-type ascending price auctions with first price sealed bid auctions in private values environments with multiobject demands. Special attention is paid to the effect of closing rules on ascending auctions’ outcomes. We find that simultaneous ascending auctions with the soft closing rule are the most efficient, while the sealed bid auctions generate the highest revenue. Ascending auctions with the hard closing rule display a significant amount of late bidding, resulting in the lowest among the three institutions revenue and efficiency.

Keywords

Multi-object auctionsExperiments

JEL classification

D44: AuctionsC92: Laboratory, Group Behavior

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , March 2009, pp. 42 - 64
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2007

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9189-6) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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Supplementary material: File

Sherstyuk supplementary material

Table A1
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Table A2
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Table A3
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Figure F1
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Figure F2
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Figure F3
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