Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-z4zkx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T15:52:49.003Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Competition among public good providers for donor rewards

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Natalie Struwe
Affiliation:
Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck, Universitaetsstrasse 15, 6020 Innsbruck, Austria
Esther Blanco
Affiliation:
Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck, Universitaetsstrasse 15, 6020 Innsbruck, AustriaThe Ostrom Workshop, Indiana University, Bloomington, USA
James M. Walker*
Affiliation:
The Ostrom Workshop, Indiana University, Bloomington, USADepartment of Economics, Indiana University, Wylie Hall 105, 47405 Bloomington, IN, USA

Abstract

We present experimental evidence for decision settings where public good providers compete for endogenous rewards which are donations (transfers) offered by outside donors. Donors receive benefits from public good provision but cannot provide the good themselves. The performance of three competition mechanisms is examined in relation to the level of public good provision and transfers offered by donors. In addition to a contest where transfers received by public good providers are proportional to effort, we study two contests with exclusion from transfers, namely a winner-takes-all and a loser-gets-nothing. We compare behavior in these three decision settings to the default setting of no-contest (no-transfers). Results for this novel decision environment with endogenous transfers show that donors offer transfers (contest prizes) at similar levels across contests and contributions to the public good are not significantly different in the three contests settings, but are consistently and significantly higher in all contests compared to the setting with no-transfers. Initially, the winner-takes-all setting leads to a significantly higher increase in public good contributions compared to the other two contests; but this difference diminishes across decision rounds.

Information

Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Economic Science Association 2022

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Supplementary material: File

Struwe et al. supplementary material

Struwe et al. supplementary material
Download Struwe et al. supplementary material(File)
File 2 MB