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Confusion and learning in the voluntary contributions game

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Ralph-C. Bayer*
Affiliation:
School of Economics, University of Adelaide, Nexus 10, SA 5005 Adelaide, Australia
Elke Renner*
Affiliation:
School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK
Rupert Sausgruber*
Affiliation:
University of Innsbruck, Department of Economics & Statistics, Universitätsstrasse 15, 6020 Innsbruck, AustriaDepartment of Economics, University of Copenhagen, DK-1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark

Abstract

We use a limited information environment to assess the role of confusion in the repeated voluntary contributions game. A comparison with play in a standard version of the game suggests, that the common claim that decision errors due to confused subjects biases estimates of cooperation upwards, is not necessarily correct. Furthermore, we find that simple learning cannot generate the kind of contribution dynamics commonly attributed to the existence of conditional cooperators. We conclude that cooperative behavior and its decay observed in public goods games is not a pure artefact of confusion and learning.

Information

Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 Economic Science Association

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Confusion and Learning in the Voluntary Contributions Game – Online Appendix
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