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Confusopoly: competition and obfuscation in markets

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Kenan Kalaycı*
Affiliation:
School of Economics, University of Queensland, Colin Clark Building (39), St. Lucia, QLD 4072, Australia

Abstract

This paper examines the effects of competition in experimental posted-offer markets where sellers can confuse buyers. I report two studies. In one, the sellers offering heterogeneous goods can obfuscate buyers by means of spurious product differentiation. In the other study, sellers offer identical goods and make their prices unnecessarily complex by having multi-part tariffs. I vary the level of competition by having treatments with two and three- sellers in both studies, and having an additional treatment with five-sellers in one study. The results show that average complexity created by a seller is not different for the treatments with two, three and five sellers. In addition, market prices are highest and buyer surplus is lowest when there are two sellers in a market.

Information

Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 Economic Science Association

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