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Continuous-Time Strategy Selection in Linear Population Games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Siegfried K. Berninghaus
Affiliation:
Institute for Statistics & Mathematical Economics, University of Karlsruhe
Claudia Keser
Affiliation:
Institute for Statistics & Mathematical Economics, University of Karlsruhe
Karl-Martin Ehrhart
Affiliation:
Institute for Statistics & Mathematical Economics, University of Karlsruhe

Abstract

In an experimental evolutionary game framework we investigate whether subjects end up in a socially efficient state. We examine two games, a game where the socially efficient state is also an equilibrium and a game which has no equilibrium in pure strategies at all. Furthermore, we distinguish between a situation in which the subjects are completely informed about the payoff function and a situation in which they are incompletely informed. We observe that subjects spend the greater part of the time at or near the efficient state. If the efficient state is an equilibrium, they spend more time there than otherwise. Furthermore, incomplete information increases the time spent at the efficient state.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 Economic Science Association

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