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Directional behavioral spillover and cognitive load effects in multiple repeated games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Tracy Xiao Liu,
Jenna Bednar,
Yan ChenOpen the ORCID record for Yan Chen[Opens in a new window] and
Scott Page
Tracy Xiao Liu*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
Jenna Bednar*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA
Yan Chen*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Tsinghua University, Beijing, ChinaSchool of Information, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA
Scott Page*
Affiliation:
Departments of Political Science and Economics, Center for the Study of Complex Systems, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA
*
liuxiao@sem.tsinghua.edu.cn
jbednar@umich.edu
yanchen@umich.edu
scottepage@gmail.com
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Abstract

In this study, we use a novel design to test for directional behavioral spillover and cognitive load effects in a set of multiple repeated games. Specifically, in our experiment, each subject plays a common historical game with two different matches for 100 rounds. After 100 rounds, the subject switches to a new game with one match and continues playing the historical game with the other match. This design allows us to identify the direction of any behavioral spillover. Our results show that participants exhibit both behavioral spillover and cognitive load effects. First, for pairs of Prisoners’ Dilemma and Alternation games, we find that subjects apply strategies from the historical game when playing the new game. Second, we find that those who participate in a Self Interest game as either their historical or new game achieve Pareto efficient outcomes more often in the Prisoners’ Dilemma and Alternation games compared to their control counterparts. Overall, our results show that, when faced with a new game, participants use strategies that reflect both behavioral spillover and cognitive load effects.

Keywords

Multiple gamesRepeated gamesBehavioral spilloversCognitive loadEntropy

JEL classification

C91: Laboratory, Individual BehaviorC72: Noncooperative Games

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 22 , Issue 3: Special Issue in Honor of Charles R. Plott , September 2019, pp. 705 - 734
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9570-7) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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