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Dominated choices in a simple game with large stakes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Egil Matsen*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 7491 Trondheim, Norway
Bjarne Strøm*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 7491 Trondheim, Norway

Abstract

This paper examines data from the Norwegian television game show Joker, where contestants make well-specified choices under risk. The game involves very large stakes, randomly drawn contestants, and ample opportunities for learning. Central models of risk choice, including expected utility theory, give a simple prediction of choice under weak conditions, as one decision is always first-order stochastically dominating. We document frequent, systematic and costly violations of dominance. Many contestants appear to have a systematic expectation bias that can be related to Tversky and Kahneman's (Cogn. Psychol. 5(2):207-232, 1973) “availability heuristic”. In addition, contestants seem to make systematic calculation errors that are well captured by the so-called Fechner model.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2009

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