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The False Consensus Effect Disappears if Representative Information and Monetary Incentives Are Given

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Dirk Engelmann and
Martin Strobel
Dirk Engelmann*
Affiliation:
Institut für Öffentliche Finanzen, Wettbewerb und Institutionen, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Spandauer Str. 1, D-10178 Berlin, Germany
Martin Strobel*
Affiliation:
Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie III, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Spandauer Str 1, D-10178 Berlin, Germany
*
email: engelman@wiwi.hu-berlin.de
email: strobel@wiwi.hu-berlin.de
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Abstract

We present an experiment on the false consensus effect. Unlike previous experiments, we provide monetary incentives for revealing the actual estimation of others’ behavior. In each session and round, sixteen subjects make a choice between two options simultaneously. Then they estimate the choices of a randomly selected subgroup. For half of the rounds we provide information about other subjects’ choices. There we find no false consensus effect. At an aggregate level, subjects significantly underweight rather than overweight their choices. When we do not provide information, the presence of a false consensus effect cannot be detected.

Keywords

false consensorexperimental economics

JEL classification

D84: Expectations • SpeculationsC91: Laboratory, Individual BehaviorD83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 3 , Issue 3 , December 2000, pp. 241 - 260
Copyright
Copyright © 2001 Economic Science Association

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