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Gender pairing and bargaining—Beware the same sex!

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Matthias Sutter*
Affiliation:
Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck, Universitaetsstr. 15/4, 6020 Innsbruck, AustriaDepartment of Economics, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, 40530 Göteborg, Sweden
Ronald Bosman*
Affiliation:
Financial Stability Division, De Nederlandsche Bank, Westeinde 1, 1017 ZN Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Martin G. Kocher*
Affiliation:
Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck, Universitaetsstr. 15/4, 6020 Innsbruck, AustriaDepartment of Economics, University of Munich, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, 80539 Munich, Germany
Frans van Winden*
Affiliation:
CREED/Department of Economics, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Abstract

We study the influence of gender and gender pairing on economic decision making in an experimental two-person bargaining game where the other party's gender is known to both actors. We find that (1) gender per se has no significant effect on behavior, whereas (2) gender pairing systematically affects behavior. In particular, we observe much more competition and retaliation and, thus, lower efficiency when the bargaining partners have the same gender than when they have the opposite gender. These findings are consistent with predictions from evolutionary psychology. Implications of our results for real-world organizations are discussed.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2009

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