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Implications of trust, fear, and reciprocity for modeling economic behavior

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

James C. Cox*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and Experimental Economics Center (ExCen), Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30302-3992
Klarita Sadiraj*
Affiliation:
Social and Cultural Planning Office of The Netherlands (SCP), PO Box 16164, 2500 BD, The Hague, The Netherlands
Vjollca Sadiraj*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and Experimental Economics Center (ExCen), Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30302-3992

Abstract

This paper reports three experiments with triadic or dyadic designs. The experiments include the moonlighting game in which first-mover actions can elicit positively or negatively reciprocal reactions from second movers. First movers can be motivated by trust in positive reciprocity or fear of negative reciprocity, in addition to unconditional other-regarding preferences. Second movers can be motivated by unconditional other-regarding preferences as well as positive or negative reciprocity. The experimental designs include control treatments that discriminate among actions with alternative motivations. Data from our three experiments and a fourth one are used to explore methodological questions, including the effects on behavioral hypothesis tests of within-subjects vs. across-subjects designs, single-blind vs. double-blind payoffs, random vs. dictator first-mover control treatments, and strategy responses vs. sequential play.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 Economic Science Association

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