Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-wxvwp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T15:43:18.073Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Learning to Accept in Ultimatum Games: Evidence from an Experimental Design that Generates Low Offers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

John A. List
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816-1400
Todd L. Cherry
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC 28608-2051

Abstract

Focusing on responder behavior, we report panel data findings from both low and high stakes ultimatum bargaining games. Whereas Slonim and Roth (1998) find that offers are rejected fairly equally across rounds in both low and high stakes games, we find that learning does take place, but only when there is sufficient money on the table. The disparate results can be reconciled when one considers the added power that our experimental design provides-detecting subtle temporal differences in responder behavior requires a data generation process that induces a significant number of proportionally low offers.

Information

Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 Economic Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable