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Managerial incentives and stock price dynamics: an experimental approach

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Te Bao
Affiliation:
Division of Economics, School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore
Edward Halim
Affiliation:
Division of Economics, School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore
Charles N. Noussair*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Eller College of Management, The University of Arizona, Tucson, USA
Yohanes E. Riyanto
Affiliation:
Division of Economics, School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore

Abstract

We investigate experimentally how granting a manager stock ownership and the opportunity to trade shares of a company’s stock influence the manager’s effort and the overall behavior of the market for the company’s shares. In our design, managerial effort affects the fundamental value of the firm. Our findings suggest that endowing a manager with stock does not significantly increase the manager’s effort. When the manager is allowed to trade the company’s shares, however, she tends to accumulate additional shares, increase her effort, and raise company value. In all of our treatments, prices tend to reflect underlying fundamentals, and bubbles are rare.

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Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © 2021 Economic Science Association

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