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On the Design of Peer Punishment Experiments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Marco Casari*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907, USA

Abstract

Some peer punishment technologies may bias experimental results in unwanted ways. A critical parameter to consider in the design is the “fine-to-fee” ratio, which measures the income reduction for the targeted subject relative to the cost for the subject who requested the punishment. We show that a punishment technology commonly used in experiments embeds a variable fine-to-fee ratio and show that it could confound the empirical findings about why, whom, and how much subjects punish.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2005 Economic Science Association

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