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One bad apple? Heterogeneity and information in public good provision

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Angela C. M. de Oliveira*
Affiliation:
University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics, 203 Stockbridge Hall, 80 Campus Center Way, Amherst, MA 01003, USA
Rachel T. A. Croson
Affiliation:
University of Texas, Arlington Dean, College of Business, Box 19377, 701 S. West Street, Room 334, Arlington, TX 76019, USA
Catherine Eckel
Affiliation:
Texas A&M University, Department of Economics 4228 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843-4228, USA

Abstract

Previous research demonstrates that individuals vary in their social preferences. Less well-understood is how group composition affects the behavior of different social preference types. Does one bad apple really spoil the bunch? This paper exogenously identifies experimental participants’ social preferences, then systematically assigns individuals to homogeneous or heterogeneous groups to examine the impact of ‘bad apples’ on cooperation and efficiency. Consistent with previous research, we find that groups with more selfish types achieve lower levels of efficiency. We identify two mechanisms for the effect. First, the selfish players contribute less. Second, selfish players induce lower contributions from the conditional cooperators, and this effect increases in the number of selfish players. These results are not sensitive to information about the distribution of types in the group.

Information

Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 Economic Science Association

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