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Re-matching, information and sequencing effects in posted offer markets

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Douglas Davis*
Affiliation:
Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284-4000, USA
Oleg Korenok*
Affiliation:
Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284-4000, USA
Robert Reilly*
Affiliation:
Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284-4000, USA

Abstract

This paper evaluates the effects of some standard procedural variations on outcomes in posted offer oligopoly experiments. Variations studied include the presence or absence of market information, the use of re-matched or fixed seller pairs and alterations in the order of sequencing. Experimental results indicate that such variations can have first order effects on outcomes. For this reason, we recommend that results in oligopoly experiments be carefully interpreted in light of the procedures selected.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 Economic Science Association

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