No CrossRef data available.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2025
We compare uniform price auctions with fixed price offerings in Initial Public Offerings (IPO) using laboratory experiments. The experimental environment is based on the Biais and Faugeron-Grouzet (J. Financ. Intermed. 11:9-36, 2002) model. Standard predictions based on tacit collusion equilibria (TCE) suggest lower revenues in uniform price auctions, although alternative equilibria allow for higher revenues. In our experiment, there is no evidence that TCE are played. The experiment suggests that the uniform price auctions are superior to fixed price offerings in terms of raising revenues.
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-008-9210-8) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.