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Allotment in first-price auctions: an experimental investigation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Luca Corazzini*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Messina, Piazza XX Settebre, 4, 98122 Messina, ItalyISLA, Bocconi University, via Röntgen, 1, 20136 Milan, Italy
Stefano Galavotti*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and Management, University of Padova, Via del Santo 33, 35123 Padova, ItalyCentro Studi di Economia e Tecnica dell’Energia “Giorgio Levi Cases”, University of Padova, Padova, Italy
Rupert Sausgruber*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Welthandelsplatz 1, 1020 Vienna, Austria
Paola Valbonesi*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and Management, University of Padova, Via del Santo 33, 35123 Padova, ItalyNational Research University Higher School of Economics, Russian Federation Moscow-Perm, RussiaCentro Studi di Economia e Tecnica dell’Energia “Giorgio Levi Cases”, University of Padova, Padova, Italy

Abstract

We experimentally study the effects of allotment—the division of an item into homogeneous units—in independent private value auctions. We compare a bundling first-price auction with two equivalent treatments where allotment is implemented: a two-unit discriminatory auction and two simultaneous single-unit first-price auctions. We find that allotment in the form of a discriminatory auction generates a loss of efficiency with respect to bundling. In the allotment treatments, we observe large and persistent bid spread, and the discriminatory auction is less efficient than simultaneous auctions. We provide a unified interpretation of our results that is based on both a non-equilibrium response to the coordination problem characterizing the simultaneous auction format and a general class of behavioral preferences that includes risk aversion, joy of winning and loser’s regret as specific cases.

Information

Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 Economic Science Association

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