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Asymmetric and endogenous within-group communication in competitive coordination games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Timothy N. Cason,
Roman M. Sheremeta and
Jingjing Zhang
Timothy N. Cason*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, 403 W. State St., West Lafayette, IN 47906, USA
Roman M. Sheremeta
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University, 11119 Bellflower Road, Cleveland, OH 44106, USAEconomic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, USA
Jingjing Zhang
Affiliation:
Economics Discipline Group, University of Technology Sydney, PO Box 123, Broadway, Sydney, NSW 2007, Australia
*
cason@purdue.edu
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Abstract

Within-group communication in competitive coordination games has been shown to increase competition between groups and lower efficiency. This study further explores potentially harmful effects of communication, by addressing the questions of (1) asymmetric communication and (2) the endogenous emergence of communication. Our theoretical analysis provides testable hypotheses regarding the effect of communication on competitive behavior and efficiency. We test these predictions using a laboratory experiment. The experiment shows that although asymmetric communication is not as harmful as symmetric communication, it leads to more aggressive competition and lower efficiency relative to the case when neither group can communicate. Moreover, groups vote to endogenously establish communication channels even though they would earn higher payoffs if jointly they chose to restrict within-group communication.

Keywords

Between-group competitionWithin-group competitionCommunicationCoordinationContestsExperiments

JEL classification

H41: Public GoodsC70: GeneralD72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 20 , Issue 4 , December 2017, pp. 946 - 972
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-017-9519-2) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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Appendix (Not for Publication) – Experiment Instructions
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