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Beliefs and (in)stability in normal-form games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Kyle HyndmanOpen the ORCID record for Kyle Hyndman[Opens in a new window],
Antoine Terracol and
Jonathan Vaksmann
Kyle Hyndman*
Affiliation:
University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, USA
Antoine Terracol*
Affiliation:
LED, Université Paris 8 Vincennes - Saint-Denis, Saint-Denis, France
Jonathan Vaksmann*
Affiliation:
GAINS-TEPP, IRA, Le Mans Université, Le Mans, France
*
kyleb.hyndman@utdallas.edu, url: https://hyndman-honhon.com/kyle-hyndman.html
antoine.terracol@univ-paris8.fr
jonathan.vaksmann@univ-lemans.fr
Get accessRights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In this paper, we use experimental data to study players’ stability in normal-form games where subjects have to report beliefs and choose actions. Subjects saw each of 12 games four times in a regular or isomorphic form spread over two days without feedback. We document a high degree of stability within the same (strategically equivalent) game, although time and changes in the presentation of the game do lead to less stability. To look at stability across different games, we adopt the level-k theory, and show that stability of both beliefs and actions is significantly lower. Finally, we estimate a structural model in which players either apply a consistent level of reasoning across strategically different games, or reasoning levels change from game to game. Our results show that approximately 23% of subjects apply a consistent level of reasoning across the 12 games, but that they assign a low level of sophistication to their opponent. The remaining 77% apply different levels of reasoning to different games. We show that this may be due to subjects being attracted to the action with the highest possible payoff.

Keywords

Game theoryBeliefsStabilityLevel-k thinkingExperimentC72C91D83

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 25 , Issue 4 , September 2022, pp. 1146 - 1172
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Economic Science Association 2022

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Footnotes

Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09747-w.

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