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Bertrand colludes more than Cournot

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Sigrid Suetens and
Jan Potters
Sigrid Suetens*
Affiliation:
University of Antwerp, Department of Economics, Prinsstraat 13, B-2000 Antwerp Belgium
Jan Potters*
Affiliation:
Tilburg University, CentER, P.O.Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
*
e-mail: sigrid.suetens@ua.ac.be
e-mail: j.j.m.potters@uvt.nl
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Abstract

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On the basis of evidence of past oligopoly experiments, we argue that there is often significantly more tacit collusion in Bertrand price-choice than in Cournot quantity-choice markets.

Keywords

CollusionQuantity-choice and price-choice experiments

JEL classification

D21: Firm Behavior: TheoryL00: GeneralL13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 10 , Issue 1 , March 2007, pp. 71 - 77
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NC
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Copyright
Copyright © 2007 Economic Science Association

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