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Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Matthias Cinyabuguma ,
Talbot Page  and
Louis Putterman
Matthias Cinyabuguma*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Maryland, Baltimore County
Talbot Page*
Affiliation:
Economics and Environmental Studies, Brown University
Louis Putterman*
Affiliation:
Deparment of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912
*
e-mail: matthias@umbc.edu
e-mail: talbot_page@brown.edu
e-mail: louis_putterman@brown.edu
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Abstract

Recent experiments have shown that voluntary punishment of free riders can increase contributions, mitigating the free-rider problem. But frequently punishers punish high contributors, creating “perverse” incentives which can undermine the benefits of voluntary punishment.

In our experiment, allowing punishment of punishing behaviors reduces punishment of high contributors, but gives rise to efficiency-reducing second-order “perverse” punishment. On balance, efficiency and contributions are slightly but not significantly enhanced.

Keywords

Public goodsCollective actionExperimentPunishment

JEL classification

C41: Duration Analysis • Optimal Timing Strategies C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games D71: Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 9 , Issue 3: Special Issue: Behavioral Economics , September 2006 , pp. 265 - 279
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 Economic Science Association

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