Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-wxvwp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-15T04:06:11.932Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Coordination and Information in Critical Mass Games: An Experimental Study

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Giovanna Devetag
Giovanna Devetag*
Affiliation:
Department of Management and Computer Science, University of Trento
*
email: devetag@cs.unitn.it
Get accessRights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

We present experimental results on a repeated coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria in which a payoff from choosing an action is positive only if a critical mass of players choose that action. We design a baseline version of the game in which payoffs remain constant for values above the critical mass, and an increasing returns version in which payoffs keep increasing for values above the critical mass. We test the predictive power of security and payoff-dominance under different information treatments. Our results show that convergence to the payoff- dominant equilibrium is the modal limit outcome when players have full information about others’ previous round choices, while this outcome never occurs in the remaining treatments. The paths of play in some groups reveal a tacit dynamic coordination by which groups converge to the efficient equilibrium in a step-like manner. Moreover, the frequency and speed of convergence to the payoff-dominant equilibrium are higher, ceteris paribus, when increasing returns are present. Finally, successful coordination seems to crucially depend on players’ willingness to signal to others the choice of the action supporting the efficient equilibrium.

Keywords

coordinationcritical massinformationlearningsignaling

JEL classification

C91: Laboratory, Individual BehaviorC92: Laboratory, Group BehaviorC72: Noncooperative Games

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 6 , Issue 1 , June 2003, pp. 53 - 73
Copyright
Copyright © 2003 Economic Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Arthur, B. (1994). Increasing Returns and Path-Dependence in the Economy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Battalio, R., Samuelson, L., and Van Huyck, J. (2001). “Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games.” Econometrica. 69(3), 749–764.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Berninghaus, S.K. and Ehrhart, K.M. (1998). “Time Horizon and Equilibrium Selection in Tacit Coordination Games: Experimental Results.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 37, 231–248.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bornstein, G., Gneezy, U., and Nagel, R. (2002). “The Effect of Intergroup Competition on Intragroup Coordination: An Experimental Study.” Games and Economic Behavior. 41, 1–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blume, A. and Ortmann, A. (2000). “The Effects of Costless Pre-play Communication: Experimental Evidence from a Game with Pareto-ranked Equilibria.” Charles University Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education Working Paper.Google Scholar
Camerer, C.F. and Ho, T.H. (2000). “Sophisticated EWA Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games.” Journal of Economic Theory. 104(1), 137–188.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Camerer, C.F. and Ho, T.H. (2002) “Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Normal form Games.” Econometrica. 67, 827–874.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clark, K. and Sefton, M. (2001). “Repetition and Signalling: Experimental Evidence from Games with Efficient Equilibria.” Economics Letters. 70, 357–362.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cooper, R. (1999). Coordination Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crawford, V. (1991). “An “Evolutionary” Interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Experimental Results on Coordination.” Games and Economic Behavior. 3(1), 25–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
David, P. and Greenstein, S. (1992). “The Economics of Compatibility Standard: An Introduction to Recent Research.” Economics of Innovation and New Technologies. 1, 3–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Duffy, J. and Feltovich, N. (1999). “Does Observation of Others Affect Learning in Strategic Environments? An Experimental Study.” International Journal of Game Theory. 28, 131–152.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Duffy, J. and Feltovich, N. (2002). “Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? An Experimental Analysis of Observation and Cheap Talk.” Games and Economic Behavior. 39, 1–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Duffy, J. and Hopkins, . (2001). “Learning, Information and Sorting in Market Entry Games: Theory and Evidence.” Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh Working Paper.Google Scholar
Erev, I. and Rapoport, A. (1998). “Coordination, ‘Magic’ and Reinforcement Learning in a Market Entry Games.” Games and Economic Behavior. 23(2), 146–175.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Erev, I. and Roth, A.E. (1998). “Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria.” American Economic Review. 88, 848–881.Google Scholar
Farrel, J. and Saloner, G. (1986). “Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product Preannouncements and Predation.” American Economic Review. 76, 940–855.Google Scholar
Feltovich, N. (2001). “Non Parametric Tests of Differences in Medians: Comparisons of the Wilcoxon-Mann- Whitney and Robust Rank-Order Tests.” Department of Economics, University of Houston Working Paper.Google Scholar
Fudenberg, D. and Levine, D. (1998). The Theory of Learning in Games. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Goeree, J.K. and Holt, C.H. (1999). “An Experimental Study of Costly Coordination.” University of Virginia, Department of Economics Working Paper.Google Scholar
Goeree, J.K. and Holt, C.H. (2001). “Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions.” American Economic Review. 91(5), 1402–1422.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Granovetter, M. and Soong, R. (1986). “Threshold Models of Interpersonal Effects in Consumer Demand.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 7, 83–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Katz, M. and Shapiro, C. (1986). “Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities.” Journal of Political Economy. 94, 823–841.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Keser, C., Ehrhart, K.M., and Berninghaus, S.K. (1998). “Coordination and Local Interaction: Experimental Evidence.” Economics Letters. 58, 269–275.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ledyard, J. (1995). “Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research.” In Roth, A. and Kagel, J. (eds.), The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 111–194.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mitzekewitz, M. and Nagel, R. (1993). “Envy, Greed, and Anticipation in Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study.” International Journal of Game Theory. 28, 171–198.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nagel, R. (1995). “Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study.” American Economic Review. 85, 1013–8026.Google Scholar
Schelling, T. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Schelling, T. (1978). Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: E.W. Norton.Google Scholar
Selten, R. and Stoecker, R. (1986). “End Behavior in Sequences of Finite Prisoner's Dilemma Supergames: A Learning Theory Approach.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 7, 47–00.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Siegel, S. and Castellan, Jr. (1992). Statistica Non Parametrica. Milano: McGraw-Hill, pp. 191–198.Google Scholar
Van Huyck, J., Battalio, R., and Beil, R. (1990). “Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure.” American Economic Review. 80, 234–248.Google Scholar
Van Huyck, J., Battalio, R., and Beil, R. (1991). “Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 106, 885–910.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van Huyck, J., Battalio, R., and Beil, R. (1993). “Asset Markets as an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions, and Forward Induction.” Games and Economic Behavior. 5(3), 485–504.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van Huyck, J., Battalio, R., and Rankin, F. (2001). “Evidence on Learning in Coordination Games.” Texas A&M University Laser Script.Google Scholar