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Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions: a laboratory experiment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Joana Pais*
Affiliation:
ISEG, UECE (Research Unit in Complexity in Economics) and REM (Research in Economics and Mathematics), Universidade de Lisboa, Rua Miguel Lupi, 20, 1200-827 Lisboa, Portugal
Ágnes Pintér*
Affiliation:
Department of Economic Analysis, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Cantoblanco, 28049 Madrid, Spain
Róbert F. Veszteg*
Affiliation:
School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, 1-6-1 Nishiwaseda, Shinjuku-ku, 169-8050 Tokyo, Japan

Abstract

In a series of laboratory experiments, we explore the impact of different market features (the level of information, search costs, and the level of commitment) on agents’ behavior and on the outcome of decentralized matching markets. In our experiments, subjects on each side of the market actively search for a partner, make proposals, and are free to accept or reject any proposal received at any time throughout the game. Our results suggest that a low information level does not affect the stability or the efficiency of the final outcome, although it boosts market activity, unless coupled with search costs. Search costs have a significant negative impact on stability and on market activity. Finally, commitment harms stability slightly but acts as a disciplinary device to market activity and is associated with higher efficiency levels of the final outcome.

Information

Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © 2019 Economic Science Association

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