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Dictator games: a meta study

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Christoph Engel
Christoph Engel*
Affiliation:
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Straße 10, 53113 Bonn, Germany
*
e-mail: engel@coll.mpg.de
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Abstract

Over the last 25 years, more than a hundred dictator game experiments have been published. This meta study summarises the evidence. Exploiting the fact that most experiments had to fix parameters they did not intend to test, in multiple regression the meta study is able to assess the effect of single manipulations, controlling for a host of alternative explanatory factors. The resulting rich dataset also provides a testbed for comparing alternative specifications of the statistical model for analysing dictator game data. It shows how Tobit models (assuming that dictators would even want to take money) and hurdle models (assuming that the decision to give a positive amount is separate from the choice of amount, conditional on giving) provide additional insights.

Keywords

Dictator gameMeta-studyMultiple regressionTobitHurdle model

JEL classification

C24: Truncated and Censored Models • Switching Regression Models • Threshold Regression ModelsC91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 14 , Issue 4 , November 2011, pp. 583 - 610
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi: 10.1007/s10683-011-9283-7) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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