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Dynamic runs and circuit breakers: an experiment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Jacopo Magnani*
Affiliation:
Division of Social Science, New York University Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
David Munro*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Middlebury College, 14 Old Chapel Rd., Warner Hall 505, 05753 Middlebury, VT, USA

Abstract

Although now widespread in financial markets, circuit breakers remain controversial among researchers and professional investors. We formalize the popular argument that circuit breakers provide a “cooling-off” period for investors during market runs and we test it in the laboratory. Our experiment reproduces a market where investors fear future liquidity shocks but receive news about the true state over time. Notably, we find that when information quality is poor circuit breakers can have perverse effects on trading behavior. However, when information quality is high, circuit breakers can improve welfare by providing agents with time to learn about the true state, when private incentives to wait for more information are insufficient.

Information

Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © 2019 Economic Science Association

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