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The effect of payoff tables on experimental oligopoly behavior

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Özgür Gürerk and
Reinhard Selten
Özgür Gürerk*
Affiliation:
Laboratory for Experimental Economics, University of Erfurt, Nordhäuser Str. 63, 99089 Erfurt, Germany
Reinhard Selten*
Affiliation:
BonnEconLab, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, 53113 Bonn, Germany
*
oezguer.guererk@uni-erfurt.de
rselten@uni-bonn.de
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Abstract

We explore the effects of the provision of an information-processing instrument—payoff tables—on behavior in experimental oligopolies. In one experimental setting, subjects have access to payoff tables whereas in the other setting they have not. It turns out that this minor variation in presentation has non-negligible effects on participants’ behavior, particularly in the initial phase of the experiment. In the presence of payoff tables, subjects tend to be more cooperative. As a consequence, collusive behavior is more likely and quickly to occur.

Keywords

CollusionCournot oligopolyPayoff tablesBounded rationalityFramingPresentation effect

JEL classification

C92: Laboratory, Group BehaviorL13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect MarketsC72: Noncooperative Games

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 15 , Issue 3 , September 2012, pp. 499 - 509
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-011-9310-8) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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