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Fairness has less impact when agents are less informed

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Jennie Huang,
Judd B. KesslerOpen the ORCID record for Judd B. Kessler[Opens in a new window] and
Muriel Niederle
Jennie Huang*
Affiliation:
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA
Judd B. Kessler*
Affiliation:
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA
Muriel Niederle*
Affiliation:
Stanford University, Stanford, USA
*
huangzh@wharton.upenn.edu
judd.kessler@wharton.upenn.edu
niederle@stanford.edu
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Abstract

Research from the last four decades suggests that fairness plays an important role in economic transactions. However, the vast majority of this research investigates behavior in an environment where agents are fully informed. We develop a new experimental paradigm—nesting the widely used ultimatum game—and find that fairness has less impact on outcomes when agents are less informed. As we remove information, offers become less generous and unfair offers are more likely to be accepted.

Keywords

FairnessUltimatum gameInformationExperiment

JEL classification

C91: Laboratory, Individual BehaviorD91: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 27 , Issue 1: Special Issue in Honor of John H. Kagel , March 2024, pp. 155 - 174
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Economic Science Association 2023

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Footnotes

Funding for the study came from The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, the Wharton Behavioral Lab, and Stanford University.

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