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Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Jordi Brandts  and
Gary Charness
Jordi Brandts*
Affiliation:
Instituto de Análisis Económico (CSIC), Barcelona
Gary Charness*
Affiliation:
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona
*
email: brandts@cc.uab.es
email: charness@upf.es
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Abstract

In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our “hot” treatment the second player responds to the first player's observed action while in our “cold” treatment we follow the “strategy method” and have the second player decide on a contingent action for each and every possible first player move, without first observing this move. Our analysis centers on the degree to which subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniary rewards, as a response to others’ actions. Our results show no difference in behavior between the two treatments. We also find evidence of the stability of subjects’ preferences with respect to their behavior over time and to the consistency of their choices as first and second mover.

Keywords

experimentscooperationstrategy method

JEL classification

C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 2 , Issue 3 , March 2000 , pp. 227 - 238
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 Economic Science Association

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