Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-2n9c9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T01:12:13.526Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

How sensitive are bargaining outcomes to changes in disagreement payoffs?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Nejat Anbarci*
Affiliation:
School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Deakin University, 70 Elgar Road, Burwood, VIC 3125, Australia
Nick Feltovich*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Monash University, Clayton, VIC 3800, Australia

Abstract

We use a human-subjects experiment to investigate how bargaining outcomes are affected by changes in bargainers’ disagreement payoffs. Subjects bargain against changing opponents, with randomly drawn asymmetric disagreement outcomes that vary over plays of the game, and with complete information about disagreement payoffs and the cake size. We find that subjects only respond about half as much as theoretically predicted to changes in their own disagreement payoff and to changes in their opponent’s disagreement payoff. This effect is observed in a standard Nash demand game and a related unstructured bargaining game, in both early and late rounds, and is robust to moderate changes in stake sizes. We show theoretically that standard models of expected utility maximisation are unable to account for this under-responsiveness, even when generalised to allow for risk aversion. We also show that quantal-response equilibrium has, at best, mixed success in characterising our results. However, a simple model of other-regarding preferences can explain our main results.

Information

Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 Economic Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Supplementary material: File

Anbarci and Feltovich supplementary material

Anbarci and Feltovich supplementary material
Download Anbarci and Feltovich supplementary material(File)
File 230.7 KB