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Individual characteristics and behavior in repeated games: an experimental study

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Douglas Davis,
Asen Ivanov and
Oleg Korenok
Douglas Davis
Affiliation:
Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, USA
Asen Ivanov*
Affiliation:
School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London, 327 Mile End Road, London E1 4NS, UK
Oleg Korenok
Affiliation:
Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, USA
*
a.ivanov@qmul.ac.uk
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Abstract

Using a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether a variety of behaviors in repeated games are related to an array of individual characteristics that are popular in economics: risk attitude, time preference, trust, trustworthiness, altruism, strategic skills in one-shot matrix games, compliance with first-order stochastic dominance, ability to plan ahead, and gender. We do find some systematic relationships. A subject’s compliance with first-order stochastic dominance as well as, possibly, patience, gender, and altruism have some systematic effects on her behavior in repeated games. At the level of a pair of subjects who are playing a repeated game, each subject’s gender as well as, possibly, patience and ability to choose an available dominant strategy in a one-shot matrix game systematically affect the frequency of the cooperate–cooperate outcome. However, overall, the number of systematic relationships is surprisingly small.

Keywords

ExperimentRepeated gameIndividual characteristics

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , March 2016, pp. 67 - 99
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9427-7) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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Appendix: Measurement Error
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