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The Influence of Indirect Democracy and Leadership Choice on Cooperation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Fanny E. Schories*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Hamburg University, Hamburg, Germany
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Abstract

The paper examines whether an institution has a differing impact on cooperation if it is introduced by a representative of the affected subjects rather than exogenously imposed. The experimental design controls for selection effects arising from the endogenous policy choice. The treatment varies whether the decision-maker is elected or randomly appointed. There is evidence of a large democracy premium in the sense that endogenously chosen institutions lead to more cooperation than identical exogenous institutions, but only if the group leader is democratically chosen. Especially the subjects who initially did not prefer the policy are more likely to cooperate if it was brought about by an elected representative. There is no democracy premium for randomly appointed group leaders.

Information

Type
Original Paper
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC-BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2022
Figure 0

Fig. 1Sequence of the Experiment

Figure 1

Table 1Prisoners’ Dilemma (left) and Coordination Game (right)

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Fig. 2Four Possible Vote Stage Outcomes (adapted from DFP (2010))

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Table 2Summary Statistics

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Fig. 3Cooperation Rates in stages 1 and 3. Depicted are the shares of subjects choosing to cooperate in each round, separated by treatment (RD and ID) and game. In stage 1, all subjects play the prisoners’ dilemma

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Table 3Individual Determinants of Institutional Preferences

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Table 4Cooperation Rates By Vote Outcome

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Table 5The Effect of Democracy

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Table 6The Effect of Democracy: p-values and q-values

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Table 7Treatment Effects – Decomposing Cooperation Rates

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Table 8Treatment Effects–Weights-Based Analysis

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Fig. 4Cooperation Rates – Representative Democracy (ID). Note: The graphs show cooperation rates for all four vote stage results separated by individual voting behavior (top panel: vote for modification, bottom panel: vote against modification)

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Fig. 5Cooperation Rates – Random Dictator (RD). Note: The graphs show cooperation rates for all four vote stage results separated by individual voting behavior (top panel: vote for modification, bottom panel: vote against modification)

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Table 9Individual Leader Support and Cooperation in ID

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Table 10Average Earnings per Vote Stage Outcome

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