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Leadership effectiveness and institutional frames

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Gerrit Frackenpohl,
Adrian Hillenbrand and
Sebastian Kube
Gerrit Frackenpohl
Affiliation:
University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany
Adrian Hillenbrand
Affiliation:
University of Bonn, Bonn, GermanyMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany
Sebastian Kube*
Affiliation:
University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany
*
kube@uni-bonn.de
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Abstract

Leadership mechanisms provide a potential means to mitigate social dilemmas, but empirical evidence on the success of such mechanisms is mixed. In this paper, we explore the institutional frame as a relevant factor for the effectiveness of leadership. We compare subjects’ behavior in public-goods experiments that are either framed positively (give-some game) or negatively (take-some game). We observe that leader and follower decisions are sensitive to the institutional frame. Leaders contribute less in the take-some game, and the correlation between leaders’ and followers’ contribution is weaker in the take-some game. Additionally, using a strategy method to elicit followers’ reactions at the individual level, we find evidence for the malleability of followers’ revealed cooperation types. Taken together, the leadership institution is found to be less efficient in the take- than in the give-frame, both in games that are played only once and repeatedly.

Keywords

LeadershipFramingSocial dilemmaPublic goodsLaboratory experiment

JEL classification

D64: Altruism • Philanthropy • Intergenerational TransfersH41: Public GoodsD02: Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and ImpactC92: Laboratory, Group Behavior

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 19 , Issue 4 , December 2016, pp. 842 - 863
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-015-9470-z) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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