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Learning to Punish: Experimental Evidence from a Sequential Step-Level Public Goods Game

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

David J. Cooper and
Carol Kraker Stockman
David J. Cooper*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University, 10900 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44106, USA
Carol Kraker Stockman*
Affiliation:
Graduate School of Public Health, University of Pittsburgh, 130 De Soto Street, A648, Pittsburgh, PA 15261, USA
*
email: djc13@po.cwru.edu
email: stockman@pitt.edu
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Abstract

This paper studies how subjects in a three-person sequential step-level public good game learn to punish free riders more over time. Our current work makes several additions to the literature on other regarding behavior. First, our experiment provides evidence that subjects care about the actions that lead to an outcome as well as the outcome itself, replicating the results of A. Falk, E. Fehr and U. Fischbacher (Economic Inquiry, in press), J. Brandts and C. Sola (Games and Economic Behavior, 36(2), 138-157, 2001.) and J.H. Kagel and K. Wolfe (Working paper, Ohio State University, 1999). Second, our experiment provides one of the first tests of the newer theories of reciprocity by A. Falk and U. Fischbacher (Working paper, University of Zurich, 2000) and G. Charness and M. Rabin (Quarterly Journal of Economics, in press) that take a psychological games approach. We find that these theories fail to explain the experimental data. Finally, we examine the mechanism by which subjects learn to punish free-riding more ofter over time.

Keywords

public goodslearningreciprocity

JEL classification

C7: Game Theory and Bargaining TheoryC9: Design of ExperimentsH4: Publicly Provided Goods

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , June 2002, pp. 39 - 51
Copyright
Copyright © 2002 Economic Science Association

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